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The failure of electrical cables exposed to severe thermal fire conditions are a 
safety concern for operating commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs).  The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has promoted the use of risk-informed and performance-
based methods for fire protection which resulted in a need to develop realistic methods to 
quantify the risk of fire to NPP safety.  Recent electrical cable testing has been conducted 
to provide empirical data on the failure modes and likelihood of fire-induced damage.  
This thesis evaluated numerous aspects of the data.  Circuit characteristics affecting fire-
induced electrical cable failure modes have been evaluated.  In addition, thermal failure 
temperatures corresponding to cable functional failures have been evaluated to develop 
realistic single point thermal failure thresholds and probability distributions for specific 
cable insulation types.  Finally, the data was used to evaluate the prediction capabilities 
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1 Introduction and Background 
 
 A fire at the Browns Ferry nuclear power plant (NPP) Unit 1 on March 22, 1975, 
forever changed the way fire protection was implemented at NPPs [Salley 2004].  The 
fire damaged multiple safety systems, and required operator manual actions to achieve a 
safe shutdown condition.  Prior to this near miss accident fire was not viewed as a 
significant threat to reactor safety and as such fire protection was not regulated by the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), but by the local and state fire codes, along with 
any insurance underwriter requirements [NRC 2009].  NRC investigations of the 1975 
Browns Ferry fire identified significant fire protection and design deficiencies and led to 
the development of a new set of fire protection requirements and guidelines, including a 
concept referred to as defense-in-depth [NRC 2002]. 
 Defense-in-depth as applied to fire protection refers to a layered approach to 
design that includes the following echelons of safety, 
• Prevent fire from starting 
• Detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur 
• Protect structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety, so that a 
fire that is not promptly extinguished by the fire suppression activities will not 
prevent the safe shutdown of the plant [NRC 2009] 
 
 The first two echelons of safety are typically covered in a NPP fire protection 
program by the use of administrative controls and properly designed conventional fire 
protection systems.  The third echelon, however, has required significant resource and 
effort by the nuclear utilities’ and the NRC to address, and 37 years following the worst 
fire to occur at a NPP, fire protection safety issues continue to be researched and 
addressed.  This last echelon of defense-in-depth requires protecting one train of safe-
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shutdown systems from fire damage.  Safe shutdown systems are systems and equipment 
that perform functions needed to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition.  Plant 
safe shutdown conditions are specified in technical specifications as standby, hot 
shutdown or cold shutdown reactor conditions [NRC 2009]. 
 Virtually every NPP system relies on power, control, and instrumentation 
electrical cables to safely operate and shutdown the plant.  Many of the most significant 
fire risk scenarios identified in past probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) involve the 
postulated loss of safe-shutdown systems through the fire-induced failure of electric 
power, instrumentation, and control cables [Lambright, Nowlen, Nicolette, and Bohn 
1989].  Detailed understanding of fire damage and environmental effects on electrical 
cable has been the subject of research even prior to the 1975 Browns Ferry Fire.  
However, only recently has research been focused on the evaluation of the failure modes 
associated with fire-induced cable damage.  In the analysis of fire risk, postulated cable 
damage scenarios often represent dominant contributors to fire-induced core damage 
frequency estimates, and often overall plant core damage frequency [Nowlen 1991].  
Advanced tools for performing fire PRA circuit analysis explicitly treating different cable 
failure modes and the resulting circuit and system impact are required to provide the most 
realistic representation of a NPPs overall fire risk [LaChance, Nowlen, Wyant, and 
Dandini 2003]. 
 One of the objectives of the NRC’s fire protection requirements and guidance are 
to provide reasonable assurance that fire-induced failure of circuits that could prevent the 
operation or cause maloperation, of equipment necessary to achieve and maintain post-
fire safe-shutdown will not occur.  In the late 1990’s, following an increased number of 
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licensee event reports identifying problems associated with post-fire safe-shutdown 
circuit analysis, the NRC issued Enforcement Guidance Memorandum 98-02 and 
Information Notice 99-17, which identified the problem and allowed for some 
enforcement discretion while NPP licensees corrected any identified problems [NRC 
1999, NRC 2000].  The root cause of the problems was often identified as differing 
interpretations of the regulations pertaining to fire-induced cable failure modes and a 
general lack of experimental data. 
 To provide a technical basis for understanding fire-induced circuit failure modes 
several sets of experiments were conducted by the Electric Power Research Institute 
(EPRI) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) [NRC 2004, Nowlen 2008, Nowlen, 
Brown, Olivier, Wyant 2012].  For the most part, the NPP industry testing illustrated that 
cable failure modes of concern1 (hot shorts, spurious operations) were a greater risk than 
had previously been thought.  The specifics of these tests are described in section 4.2.2.8 
and the most recent tests are the focus of the evaluation conducted in this thesis.   
 In addition to the fire protection testing and research, NRC rule making has 
allowed for the voluntary use of performance-based, risk-informed fire protection 
programs via the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 standard, 
“Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric 
Generating Plants, 2001 Edition [NRC 1976, NFPA 2001].”  This NFPA standard along 
with the NRC/EPRI fire PRA methodology outlined in NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI 
TR1011989) “EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities,” has 
provided a state-of-the-art methodology, allowing those utilities’ pursuing the 
                                                 
1 failure modes of concern are defined in section 3.2 
4 
 
performance-based approach to quantify plant risk from fires and make risk-reducing 
modifications to the plant. 
With the desire to use the most realistic information available in fire PRAs there 
remain numerous areas that could benefit from advancement.  The application of recent 
fire testing data to improve the accuracy of the methods could provide such 
advancements.  For example, the current NRC guidance provides a single point 
conservative thermal failure threshold to indicate cable electrical damage for the two 
broad categories of electrical cable insulation.  In reality, cables do not fail at a set 
temperature, but fail in a range of temperatures.  With a better understanding of electrical 
cable thermal fragility, quantification of cable failure probabilities using fire modeling 
and cable failure distributions can be developed.  Testing has also shown that circuit 
configuration which can influence the failure mode and duration of particular failure 
modes.  In order to advance the state-of-the-art methods, these new insights need to be 
implemented into the overall methodology.  This thesis presents several uses of the test 






 The objective of this study is to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the most 
recent fire-induced circuit failure experimentation conducted by SNL.  The focus of this 
thesis is to evaluate the SNL data to suggest cable insulation material specific thermal 
failure thresholds, develop electrical cable thermal fragility distributions, evaluate 
parameters that influence fire-induced circuit failure modes and present an analytical 
approach used to identify a unique failure mode for ungrounded common power supply 
circuits.  This thesis also evaluates the prediction capabilities of the Thermally-Induced 
Electrical Failure (THIEF) one-dimensional heat conduction model.   Finally, this thesis 
uses the THIEF model and the electrical cable thermal fragility distributions to develop 
lookup tables of cable damage probabilities.  This thesis builds upon previous work 
completed by the National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) which developed 
the THIEF model and previous testing and research conducted by EPRI that developed a 





3 Fundamentals of Electrical Cable Design and the 
Associated Fire Safety Concern 
 
3.1 Insulated electrical cable fundamentals 
 
 A NPP can require up to 1,609 km of electrical cables to allow operators to 
control numerous plant processes from a central location [Subudhi 1996].  Virtually 
every system in a NPP depends on the continuous operation of electrical cables to 
provide a low resistance (highly conductive) transmission pathway for electrical energy 
to be conducted between two points while at the same time maintaining electrical 
isolation from other conductive pathways.  Cable functionality implies maintaining the 
electrical integrity and electrical continuity of the associated circuit sufficient to ensure 
proper operation of a circuit or system [Subudhi 1996].  The nuclear regulating body 
(NRC) requires maintaining equipment necessary to shutdown the plant “free of fire 
damage.”  Therefore, electrical cables must be able to perform their intended function 
before, during, and after fire exposure as needed to achieve and maintain safe shutdown 
of the plant [Nowlen 2000].  A failure to do so would be considered an electrical cable 
functional failure. 
Modern electrical cables use stranded metallic conductors, typically made from 
tinned copper or aluminum and surrounded by a high dielectric insulation material made 
of polymers, silicone-based or rubber-based materials [Anixter 1996].  Single or multiple 
stranded conductors surrounded by insulation grouped together within a single protective 
jacket, typically made of a polymeric material, to create a multi-conductor cable.  The 
jacket serves a utilitarian purpose of providing physical protection of the insulated 
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conductors, environmental protection from water and ultraviolet radiation, and in some 
instances increased flame retardancy [Anixter 1996]. 
 Advances in the manufacturing of electrical cables have allowed for a plethora of 
cable designs, including variations in the conductor size (expressed in American Wire 
Gage [AWG]), number of conductors, insulation and jacket materials, operating voltage, 
and inclusion of drain wires, shields, or metal armor to suit various applications.  For 
operating NPP applications, cable functions can be binned into three generic categories, 
namely power, control, and instrumentation [Iqbal and Salley 2004].   
 Cables found in NPPs have different functions dependent on their application, 
thus the failure modes of cables cannot be generically evaluated, nor can the cable 
functional failure point be quantified without knowledge of the intend design function of 
the circuit that the cables are connected.  The circuit specific failure characteristics are 
one factor that complicates the understanding of cable functional failure and the 
quantification of risks associated with fire-induced cable failure.  The specific functions 
and functional failure mode characteristics of each cable type used in NPPs are discussed 
next. 
 Instrumentation cables are typically constructed of #14 AWG or smaller 
conductors with metallic shield, twisted conductor pairs or coaxial construction to 
eliminate induced or spurious signals from radio frequency or electromagnetic 
interferences.  Instrumentation cables carry low level current (mA or μA), low voltage 
(50 volts or less) analog and digital signals to provide plant parameter indication and 
system status.  These signals can be generated by sensors such as; temperature detectors, 
pressure transmitters, vibration detectors, thermocouples and fluid analyzers [Subudhi 
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1996].  Their delicate construction and low-level energy transmission causes 
instrumentation cables to be easily damaged from thermal conditions.  Thermal damage 
can cause small leakage currents between conductive media which can result in abnormal 
circuit response (off-scale high/low, erroneous indication, erroneous permissive signals, 
etc).  As a result, instrumentation cables damaged by fire may cause operator actions that 
are inappropriate for the actual state of the operating reactor. 
 Control cables are typically larger than instrument cables, ranging from #10-14 
AWG in conductor size and constructed as a multi-conductor cable (i.e., more than one 
insulated conductor within a single cable).  Control cables carry voltages in the range of 
120-240 Vac or 125 Vdc and currents on the order of a few amperes.  These cables are 
interconnected between components of a system, such as a motor starter, solenoid 
operated valve, medium voltage switchgear control circuit, relays, control 
switches/pushbuttons, and limit and torque switches.  Control cables transmit signals to 
start, stop or change a systems operating state, along with providing component status 
indication such as plant annunciation, valve position, and motor operating status 
[Subudhi 1996].  Fire-induced damage to control cables can cause erroneous indication, 
loss of system control, maloperation or spurious operation of plant equipment.  For these 
reasons, fire-induced damage to control cables poses a significant risk to NPP operations 
and the ability to achieve a reactor safe-shutdown condition. 
 Power cables are typically larger than #10AWG and can be single conductor or 
triplex cables (i.e., three conductor cable).  Power cables supply the electrical energy to 
energize motors, load centers, motor control centers, heaters, batteries, and numerous 
other electrical loads.  Operating voltage levels of power cables range from 120 Vac or 
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250 Vdc on up to the high voltage electrical transmission lines and can carry currents on 
the order of tens to thousands of amperes dependant on cable ampacity limits.  Thus fire-
induced damage to power cables will have minimal effects on the circuits powered from 
such cables up until a current limiting device is activated (fuse or circuit breaker) to clear 
the fault and de-energize plant equipment. 
 Figure 1 provides illustrations of common cable configurations for 
instrumentation, control and power multi-conductor cables.  The black circles represent 
the electrical conductors, typically made of stranded aluminum or more commonly, 
tinned copper.  The gray layer immediately surrounding the conductor is an extruded 
layer of insulation material.  This insulation provides the electrical integrity cables rely 
on to provide their design function.  There are many types of insulation materials, but 
most all can be categorized as either thermoset or thermoplastic materials.  An 
explanation of these will be provided later.  The last layer that is typically common to 
most electrical cables is the dark gray material that surrounds all of the insulated 
conductors in Figure 1.  This is the jacket, also made of polymeric materials and provides 
a utilitarian protective function and is not relied on for electrical insulation [Anixter 
1996]. 
Figure 1. Illustration of multi-conductor instrumentation, control and power cables, respectively  




 Between the insulated conductors and the exterior jacket there can be various 
other materials including fillers to provide cable roundness, drain conductors and shield 
wraps to provide electromagnetic noise reduction for instrumentation and control cables, 
armoring to provide added physical protection, among other materials depending on the 
intended application and function of the cable [Anixter 1996]. 
 Natural and synthetic polymers are typically used as insulation and jacket 
materials for insulated electrical cables.  Polymers are composed of repetitive, simple 
units (monomers) that form longer molecules.  The molecular properties such as the 
length, branching, and degree of crystallization will affect the characteristics of the 
polymers solubility, glass transition temperature, melting temperature, density, strength 
and other physical properties.  In addition, additives and plasticizers can be used to 
increase the polymer performance regarding flame retardancy and the cable resistance to 
ultraviolet, water, oil, and biodegradation [Nowlen and Wyant 2008].  The type and 
amount of these additives can have an effect on the performance of electrical cable during 
severe fire conditions.  Cable manufacturers use their own unique proprietary blends to 
achieve the desired cable specifications.  This variation in additives and plasticizers cause 
the performance of cables using the same base polymer materials to behave slightly 
different under fire conditions.  Therefore, not all PVC insulated cable fail at the same 
time from a constant exposing temperature or heat flux.  Babrauskas also identifies lack 
of repeatability among cable fire short circuit testing due to short-circuiting involving 
mechanical contact between the conductors, but this was determined both by the stress in 
the conductors and by the exact details of the melting of the polymers [Babrauskas 2003]. 
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The polymeric materials used in insulated electrical cables can be classified into 
two groups, thermoplastic (TP) and thermoset (TS).  Thermoplastics such as polyvinyl 
chloride (PVC), polyethylene (PE), and ethylene tetrafluoroethylene (ETFE) are 
materials which soften and deform when heated without irreversible changes to the 
material and can re-solidify if cooled.  Thermoplastic degradation occurs at a higher 
temperature than that of liquefaction.  Thermoset materials such as chlorinated 
polyethylene (CPE), neoprene (CP), cross-linked polyethylene (XLP or XLPE), ethylene 
propylene rubber (EPR), and chlorsulphonated polyethylene (CSPE or Hypalon), are 
infusible, insoluble, and do not melt or flow after polymerization [Hirschler and Morgan 
2008].  Thermoset materials cannot be liquefied by heat and cooled to solid form, but 
undergo chemical degradation.  Materials classified in each group have a wide thermal 
degradation range, but in general TS polymers can withstand higher temperatures during 
longer periods of time than TP polymers [Nowlen and Wyant 2008].  Table 1 presents a 
listing of common electrical cable polymer insulation materials separated by class. 
Table 1. List of common thermoset and thermoplastic electrical cable insulation materials 
[Anixter 1996] 
Thermoplastic Thermoset 
CPE chlorinated polyethylene CPE cross-linked chlorinated polyethylene 















polyethylene (trade name: Hypalon) 
PP polypropylene SR silicone rubber 
TPE thermoplastic elastomer 
k-fiber 
blend of polyaramid, phenolic-based 
and fiberglass fibers PUR polyurethane 
 
During heatup, polymer molecules increase vibration and intermolecular 
interactions have less effect as the molecules separates and the polymer expands.  At the 
decomposition stage, covalent bonds begin to break causing the long polymer chains to 
12 
 
break into smaller segments.  At this point, the damage to the polymer structure is 
irreversible.  For thermoplastic materials, the decomposition point is above its melting 
temperature causing material to flow prior to any physical/chemical changes.  For 
thermoset materials, their decomposition temperature is below it melting temperature.  
These characteristics explain why thermoplastic cables melt and thermoset cables tend to 
char and flake away during fire conditions.  When a cable is heated sufficiently, the 
mechanical properties of the insulation will degrade, causing the electrical insulation 
resistance (IR) between conductive paths to decrease.  If the IR decreases low enough for 
a current to flow across a voltage potential, an electrical fault may result [Nowlen and 
Wyant 2008]. 
Kazarians and Apostolakis describe the thermal threshold as a point where cable 
damage starts.  At this temperature a cable will experience drastic physical changes, 
however, circuit failure would be delayed depending on the shape and characteristics of 
the cables.  They go on to state that the exact modeling of these processes involved very 
complex formulations and its solution could be extremely time consuming, if not 
impossible [Kazarians and Apostolakis 1981].  From this it is understood that the 
threshold as a point where cable materials (jacket/insulation) begin to degrade, but 
doesn’t refer to the point of cable electrical functional failure (i.e., cable is no longer able 
to perform its intended design function.)   
 Cable manufactures have recently developed “fire proof” cables designed to 
address redundant safety circuit requirements within NPPs.  These cables are constructed 
of flexible stranded, high temperature conductors surrounded by composite inorganic 
layers, by electrical grade ceramified silicone rubber, or by mineral insulation 
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[Rockbestos-Surprenant 2003, Draka 2012].  These cables are not specifically evaluated 
in this thesis. 
 This section has provided a fundamental understanding of the design function and 
construction of electrical cables used in NPPs.  For a more in-depth understanding of 
electrical cable design characteristics and cable construction, a cable handbook such as 
“The Wire and Cable Technical Information Handbook,” available online from Anixter 
should be referenced. 
3.2 Fire-induced cable and circuit failure modes 
 
 As discussed in the previous section, fire can damage electrical cables which may 
result in adverse effects to plant operations.  In the commercial nuclear industry, the 
process of identifying fire-induced circuit failure modes is generally referred to as 
“circuit analysis.”  With an understanding of possible cable failure modes from fire 
effects, the resulting effect on circuit response and ultimately system response can be 
determined. 
 Circuit analysis can be broken down into three distinct tasks, namely, cable failure 
analysis, circuit failure analysis and functional impact assessment and quantification 
[LaChance, Nowlen, Wyant and Dandini 2003].  This concept is shown illustratively in 
Figure 2.  What follows is a detailed description of the cable failure modes, circuit failure 




Figure 2.  Circuit analysis process structure and associated terminology. [LaChance, Nowlen, Wyant, 
and Dandini 2003] 
 
 As discussed in this thesis, electrical cable functional failure refers to failure of an 
electrical cable to achieve its design function as a result of an exposure fire.  Cable 
damage caused by other mechanisms (physical damage, water intrusion, aging, etc.) are 
not discussed here nor will cable damage caused by self-ignited cable fires.  Although 
self-ignited cable fire are possible, NPPs’ design compliance with standards on cable 
ampacity limits has greatly reduced the likelihood of these events. 
There are three basic cable failure modes, which are: 
• open circuit 
This failure mode results in the loss of conductor integrity (i.e, 
breaking of conductor).  Figure 3 provides an illustration of a cable 
conductor open circuit.  Note that opening of a circuit protective 
device (fuse, circuit breaker) can result in the same effect to a circuit 





Figure 3. Illustration of electrical conductor open circuit (cable illustration on left, circuit illustration 
on right) 
 
• conductor to external ground short circuit 
This failure mode involved formation of a short between one (or 
more) conductors and an external ground plane.  The external ground 
plane can include (but is not limited to) grounded cable raceway, 
grounded cable shield wrap, grounded cable drain wire, or grounded 
cable armor.  Figure 4 presents an illustration of a conductor short to 
external ground shown in blue on the left, and the corresponding 
circuit response on the right.  Note that this failure mode doesn’t 
include conductor-to-grounded conductor shorts, as this would be 
classified as conductor-to-conductor short [LaChance, Nowlen, 









Figure 4. Illustration of conductor-to-external ground short circuit 
 
• conductor-to-conductor short circuit:  
This failure mode involves formation of a short circuit between two 
(or more) conductors independent of any external ground.  The 
conductor-to-conductor shorts may all be within the same cable 
(intra-cable shorting) or between conductors of different cables 
(inter-cable shorting) [LaChance, Nowlen, Wyant and Dandini 
2003].  Figure 5 provides illustrative examples of an intra-cable and 
inter-cable conductor-to-conductor short circuit failures. 
 
Figure 5. Intra-cable (left) and Inter-cable (right) conductor-to-conductor short circuit illustration 
 
• Hot short 
A unique conductor-to-conductor short circuit where one (or more) 
energized conductors come in contact with one (or more) normally 
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non-energized or non-grounded conductors [LaChance, Nowlen, 
Wyant and Dandini 2003]. Figure 6 presents an circuit illustration of 
a hot short.  Hot shorts are a circuit dependent failure mode. 
 
Figure 6. Illustration of Hot Short 
 
 In addition, some circuits are sensitive to leakage of current caused by changes in 
cable insulation resistance at elevated temperatures.  This failure mode refers to either a 
“conductor-to-external ground” or a “conductor-to-conductor” short where a breakdown 
in the electrical quality of the insulation of one or more conductors occurs such that a 
high impedance short circuit is formed, and electrical isolation is degraded.  The level of 
electrical insulation resistance reduction that constitutes a cable failure can only be 
defined in terms of the circuit of interest.  (i.e., some circuits may function properly with 
only 1,000 Ω insulation resistance, while another circuit may be more sensitive and fail at 
higher insulation resistances, such as 10,000 Ω). These particular failures are of 
importance when analyzing instrumentation circuits, annunciation circuits and indication 
portions of control circuits. 
 Conductor-to-conductor hot shorts are of interest in risk quantification studies 
because they can lead to what are known as spurious operations, which is a circuit fault 
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effect.  A spurious operation results in a component changing position as in the case of a 
valve or a component starting/stopping as in the case of a motor, pump, or compressor.  
Spurious operations are of concern because they can result in a valve re-position to an 
undesired state and possibly diverting reactor core coolant flow or blocking a flow path, 
thus challenging the operators’ ability to achieve and maintain the reactor in a safe 
shutdown condition. 
 As shown in Figure 2, circuit fault effects are dependent on the circuit to cable 
conductor configuration along with the circuit function and design.  The following 
provides a brief list of circuit fault effects, but is by no means exhaustive [LaChance, 
Nowlen, Wyant and Dandini 2003]. 
• No effect: 
the cable failure has no effect on circuit operation and continues to operate 
as if no cable failure was present 
• Loss of power: 
the cable failure causes the circuit to become de-energized or trip upstream 
overcurrent protective devices (fuses, circuit breakers, etc.) due to cable 
failure modes that result in overcurrent conditions 
• Loss of control: 
control of the circuit becomes unavaliable, any action to operate the circuit 
will be ineffective 
• Lost/inaccurate indication: 
several cable failure modes can cause the loss of instrument indication or 
component position, or it could cause the instrumentation reading and 
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component position indication to be inaccurate.  The ladder effect is of 
potential concern as a false indication that are neither off-scale low or off-
scale high may result in operator actions that are inappropriate for the actual 
plant conditions. 
• Spurious operation: 
an inadvertent energization of a device due to a hot short cable failure.  It 
should be clarified that not all hot shorts lead to spurious operations.  Only 
hot shorts to conductors that cause a circuit fault effect that energizes an end 
device are considered spurious operations.  Spurious operations are 
synonymous to spurious actuations and refer to a device (solenoid, motor 
starter contactor, breaker trip/close coil) becoming energized and thus 
causing a component to change position or start/stop inadvertently.  Circuits 
where equipment fails in the desired safe position as a result of circuit 
design (fail safe) when circuit power is lost, are not considered a hot short 
induced spurious operation. 
• Other effects:  
depending on PRA analysts’ objectives, there may be other circuit failure 
effects that are important to identify for risk quantification. 
3.3 Risk contributions from insulated electrical cable 
 
 The traditional definition of risk is the probability of an event occurring times the 
consequences of that event.  A simplified view of risk can be sought by asking three 
questions, referred to as the risk triplet; “What can go wrong?” “How likely is it?” and 
“What are the consequences?” [Callan 1998].  Fire PRA methods follow this general 
20 
 
structure, by estimating the fire-induced core damage frequency using a three-term 
model.  These terms are (1) the frequency of the postulated fire or class of fire (fi), (2) the 
conditional probability that the postulated fire will cause damage to some set of plant 
equipment (Ped,j|i), and (3) the conditional probability that given the postulated equipment 
damage, the operators will fail to recover the plant and core damage would result 
(PCD:k|i,j), expressed mathematically as [LaChance, Nowlen, Wyant and Dandini 2003] 
 ∑ ∑ , | ∑ : | ,  Equation 1 
 
 Identifying components important to safely shutting down the plant, identifying 
areas where a fire could adversely affect these components, identifying fire ignition 
frequencies, mitigating features, and fire scenario consequences provides an overall 
quantitative assessment of the plant risk due to fire.  A result of a high volume of 
electrical cables used in NPPs, the consequences that result from unique cable failure 
modes and the likelihood of having a fire affect electrical cables required to shutdown the 
plant results in certain cables being classified as high-risk contributors. 
 A cable doesn’t have to ignite and burn to pose a risk to the operation of a NPP.  
For example an exposure fire may elevate the temperature of a cable to a point where an 
electrical cable functional failure occurs due to thermal breakdown of the conductor 
insulation, but below the cable jacket’s ignition point.  Loss of a cable’s electrical 
functionality can cause various plant responses depending on the cable failure mode and 
the associated circuit(s). 
 Depending on the circuit and specific conductor failure mode, the circuit and thus 
plant response may vary widely.  For instance, a conductor-to-conductor hot short may 
energize a specific indication lamp on a control panel in a main control room, while a 
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conductor-to-external ground short on the same conductor would result in the indication 
lamp becoming unavailable.  Given the wide variety of circuit designs, numerous cable 
designs and plant cable routing configurations, along with varying plant fire hazard 
scenarios, efforts to develop a deterministic model to predict cable failure modes has 
become difficult to achieve.  Because of this, most deterministic fire analysis methods 
assume all cables within a fire area under analysis fail in their worst case position to 
evaluate their affect on shutdown of the reactor. 
 The fire PRA methods used today attempt to quantify electrical cable failure by 
assuming cable damage occurs at a specific temperature and then assigning a probability 
likelihood estimate of that circuit experiencing a failure mode of concern.  These 
likelihood estimates are based on a limited set empirical data to quantify the probability 
of a fire damage cable/circuit combination experiencing a spurious operation.  Thus, 
using current methods, the fire PRA analyst calculates the thermal exposure to a cable via 
fire modeling and then assumes cable damage when the cable temperature exceeds 
generic single point threshold values.  If the cable exceeds the generic threshold 
temperature, the analyst then assigns a likelihood estimate for the cable to experience a 
spurious operation.  Although the previous section discussed the numerous functional 
failure modes of the cables and failure modes of the circuit, current fire PRA methods are 
not and may possible never be capable of predicting specific failure modes without large 
uncertainties. 
 In summary, probabilistic risk methods attempt to quantify the risk associated 
with fire scenarios capable of damaging electrical cables, identify the worst-case failure 
mode of an associated cable of a particular system in the fire area under consideration 
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and then assign failure mode likelihood estimates to quantify the risk to that specific 
cable failure.  The failure mode likelihood estimates used today are based on expert 




4 Literature Survey 
 
4.1 Standard test methods and the term qualified cable 
 
 Several standards exist related to the fire performance of electric cable.  Most of 
these standards evaluate electrical cable ignition or flame spread characteristics and 
qualification of cables for use in a NPP environment.  However, there is one standard that 
evaluates the electrical functionality and provides a rating of 1 or 3 hours for special fire 
resistant electrical cables.  This section presents a summary of fire standards relating to 
electrical cable. 
4.1.1 Standard Cable Flame Tests 
 NRC accepted flame propagation standards include IEEE 383, “IEEE Standard 
for Qualifying Class 1E Electric Cables and Field Splices for Nuclear Power Generating 
Stations,” and IEEE 1202, “IEEE Standard for Flame-Propagation Testing of Wire and 
Cable” [NRC 2009, NRC 1978, NRC 1976].  IEEE 383 test standard qualifies an 
electrical cable to design basis events that are postulated to occur during the life of the 
plant.  The standard addresses cable degradation with time (aging), followed by exposure 
to the environmental extremes of temperature, pressure, humidity, radiation, mechanical 
stress, or chemical spray or a combination of these events [IEEE 2004].  The flame 
propagation portion of this standard (current edition endorses IEEE 1202) provides a test 
procedure to determine flame propagation characteristics of cable in vertical cable trays 
due to ignition sources either outside of or within the cable system [IEEE 2006].  Thus if 
a cable is type tested to IEEE 383 and IEEE 1202 and passes, it is commonly referred to 
in the industry as a “qualified cable.” 
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 The term “qualified” indicates that a cable has passed the flame propagation 
portion of IEEE 1202, but doesn’t directly indicate the cable’s ability to maintain 
electrical functionality during fire conditions or provide any indication of cable 
robustness to fire from an electrical standpoint.  Regardless, the terms “qualified” and 
“nonqualified” or “unqualified” cables have been used in the literature to classify cable 
electrical functional failure characteristics (critical heat flux, minimum thermal damage 
temperature threshold, etc.)   Salley identified this flaw in the EPRI FIVE methodology 
which used insulation ignition temperatures based on data from qualified cables to 
indicate the temperature at which cable functionality is lost [Salley 2000].  Recent testing 
has shown that cable ignition is not synonymous with loss of electrical functionality, as 
cables have been shown to experience an electrical functional failure prior to ignition, 
concurrent with ignition, and after ignition.  In several special cases, cables have ignited 
and not failed electrically [Nowlen and Wyant 2008, Gonzalez and Dreisbach 2008].  
4.1.2 Fire Rated Cable Standard 
 Underwriters Laboratories (UL) has developed UL 2196, “Tests for Fire Resistive 
Cables” [Underwriters Laboratories 2001] and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic 
Engineers (IEEE) has developed IEEE 1717, “IEEE Standard for Testing Circuit Integrity 
Cables Using the Hydrocarbon Pool Fire Test Protocol,” [IEEE 2011] that provide fire 
endurance ratings for electrical cables.  These standards focus on circuit integrity cables, 
which are of a different design than those found in the current generation of operating 
NPPs.  Circuit integrity cables are unique cables that are typically made of materials that 
undergo a chemical transformation into a ceramic material when heated or are 
constructed from special materials that prohibit the movement of cable conductors during 
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a thermal exposure, while maintaining a satisfactory high level of insulation resistance.  
In essence, these cables are constructed with a rated fire barrier already installed [Taylor 
2010].  These standards expose cables to the standard time-temperature profile of ASTM 
E-119 or NFPA 251 for a 20 minute duration followed by a hose stream test.  The circuit 
integrity is monitored by two incandescent lamps per circuit.  The cable is deemed to fail 
if the lamp does not remain illuminated for the duration of the fire test. 
The UL standard presents a very severe exposure and hose stream test, however 
the acceptance criteria is questionable.  The use of an indicating lamp to signify cable 
functionality is an unrealistic comparison to actual plant equipment response.  An 
incandescent lamp will remain illuminated with energized with only a fraction of its rated 
voltage.  It is difficult to correspond cable functionality from an illuminated lamp to 
actual plant equipment where specific voltage and current requirements are needed to 
properly operate equipment such as motor starters and solenoid operated valves. 
4.2 Cable fire testing 
 
 Numerous experimental and confirmatory fire test results can be found in the 
literature evaluating the performance of electrical cables to elevated thermal conditions.  
This section provides a summary of the fire testing conducted in the past related to 
nuclear safety. 
4.2.1 Cable ignition and flame propagation testing 
 
 Prior to the 1975 Browns Ferry Fire, testing was conducted to evaluate the 
separation criteria specified in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.75, “Physical Independence of 
Electrical Systems” which later endorsed IEEE 384 Standard Criteria for Independence 
of Class 1E Equipment and Circuits.  The original intent of RG 1.75 was focused on 
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protecting redundant trains of equipment from a cable initiated fire in an opposite train.  
It was later shown through testing, that exposure fires presented greater risk to damaging 
redundant trains.  After the Browns Ferry Fire the area of fire research expanded 
dramatically to evaluate the fire hazards associated with electrical cables.  These testing 
programs focused on quantifying cable flame spread, ignition characteristics, and the 
performance of various systems or components such as cable tray covers, cable electric 
raceway fire barrier systems and cable coating.  Although this testing provided valuable 
information on the fire hazards of electrical cable, there was typically no attempt to 
electrically monitor cable specimens to identify when an electrical cable functional 
failure occurred.  Cable functionality was typically assumed to be lost when the cable 
ignited or in some cases when the cable jacket material showed signs of physical 
degradation. It wasn’t until the early 1980’s when the first tests instrumented electrical 
cables to determine when cable functionality was lost from fire exposure. 
 This type of testing included those done by Przybyla and Christian who 
performed vertical flame spread type testing to identify the sensitivity of altering various 
parameters of the IEEE 383 standard flame spread standard [Przybyla and Christian 
1978].  Klamerus also preformed numerous testing to evaluate the physical separation 
guidance, and cable protective systems (coatings, covers, electric raceway fire barrier 
systems) [Klamerus 1977, 1978a, 1978b]. 
4.2.2 Cable fire testing using electrical functionality as failure criteria 
 
The private and government bodies have conducted numerous cable fire testing 
projects to evaluate various aspects of the fire hazards cables pose to the safe operation of 
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a NPP.  The following provides a brief summary of those testing projects relevant to this 
Thesis. 
4.2.2.1  EPRI Electrical Cable Damageability Study 
 
 EPRI performed a study to evaluate the damageability characteristics of cables 
under varying thermal environment.  The critical heat flux and critical energy (product of 
available heat flux and time to initiate damage) were two parameters used to 
quantitatively define the damage potential of electrical cables.  The Factory Mutual (FM) 
combustibility apparatus consisting of four coaxially arranged radiant heaters was used to 
expose the cable sample to a maximum heat flux of 70 kW/m2.  A variety of qualified and 
unqualified cables were evaluated for insulation degradation, piloted ignition, and 
electrical functional failure [Lee 1981, LaChance, Nowlen, Wyant and Dandini 2003]. 
 Electrical functionality was monitored by using a voltage drop principle that 
involved connecting all conductors within a test to each other via resistors, with a 
variable resistor connecting one end of the conductor network to ground and the other 
end connected to a power source.  The variable resistor allowed for recording voltage 
drop which would change as conductors shorted together.  A short to ground would also 
be identified when the voltage reading was zero volts.  The results indicated that the 
critical heat flux ranged from 9-24 kW/m2, with critical energies ranging from 5,560 to 
23,700 kJ/m2. 
4.2.2.2  Cable Damageability Experiments 
 
 Lukens conducted one of the first experiments that evaluated the thermal damage 
threshold for functionality of electrical cables [Lukens 1982].  This testing was part of a 
larger program to determine the adequacy of the 6.1 m separation criteria required by 
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NRC regulations.  The cable damageability program tested both IEEE-383 qualified and 
unqualified cables by exposing them to a variety of constant heat flux exposures in the 
first phase of testing and to a variety of constant temperature environments in the second 
phase.  The results reproduced in Figure 7 indicated a critical heat flux of 18 kW/m2 for 
qualified cables and 8 kW/m2 for non-qualified cables would be sufficient to cause 
electrical failure.  Under constant temperature environments (oven tests) electrical 
damage was observed at a temperature of 250 ˚C for qualified cable and 130 ˚C for non-
qualified cable when exposed for 60 minutes at constant temperatures. 
 
Figure 7. Reciprocal time to electrical failure as a function of external heat flux 
 
 Lukens’ work provided early insights to the relative robustness of qualified versus 
non-qualified cables and provided indication that the IEEE-383 standard supports 
extending the time to electrical damage along with the standards intent of flame spread 
limitations.  The methods used to determine electrical functional failures, were crude at 
best, and although the methods could distinguish gross cable failure, it is unable to 
identify the point of cable functional failure.  The critical radiant heat flux results using a 
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linear least squares approach were in good agreement with the data, however, the 
application of a constant thermal environment is questionable and difficult to use in cable 
damageability evaluations.  The lack of data reporting makes it difficult to relate the 
occurrence of electrical failure with a specific cable temperature, but summary tables are 
provided to allow for a crude approximations of cable temperature at electrical cable 
functional failure.  Nowlen later took this data and developed time to damage plots 
(discussed in section 4.2.2.5). 
4.2.2.3 Cable Damageability Test Results Phase 1 
 
 Wheelis performed 13 tests using qualified and unqualified cables to evaluate the 
electrical failure to non-steady state fire environments [Wheelis 1986].  The qualified 
cable was a three conductor, #12 AWG with XLPE insulation and jacket, rated for 600 
volts (i.e., low voltage power cable).  The unqualified cable was a three conductor, #12 
AWG, with 20/10 PE/PVC insulation and PVC jacket.  Electrical functionality was 
determined by connecting the conductors of the cables to three phase 120VAC power 
supply.  Voltage measurements on each conductor could determine when conductor-to-
conductor short or conductor-to-ground short occurred.  Cable thermocouple 
measurements were made underneath the cable jacket. 
 This testing instrumented the same cable for electrical and thermal response, 
which may have resulted in self-induced cable failure from the interaction between the 
electrical circuit and the conductive thermocouple leads.  It was also note that both 
qualified and unqualified cables “heal” themselves to some extent.  During cool down it 
was observed that the insulation resistance increased between conductor-to-conductor 
shorts, in some cases the insulation resistance returned to pre-test measurements.  This 
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phenomenon was attributed to the cable thermal expansion and contraction of the metallic 
conductors.  The results indicated that the qualified cables failed between 4.16 and 10.25 
minutes with an average failure temperature of 427 °C, while the unqualified cables failed 
between 4.5 and 9.25 minutes with an average failure temperature of 457 °C.  These 
results contradict the basic assertion that qualified cables are more robust to thermal 
insult than unqualified cables.  The author noted that these inconsistencies may have been 
due to the types of thermocouples used as both sleeved and unsleeved sub-jacket 
thermocouples were used and an approximate 50 °F difference in temperature 
measurements were noted. 
4.2.2.4  High Temperature Steam Testing  
 
 Jacobus and Fuehrer performed high temperature steam and submergence testing 
on cables that had been aged by thermal and radiation energy to achieve a simulated “end 
of life” condition [Jacobus and Fuehrer 1990].  The testing included 12 cable types 
representative of typical cables used inside containment of light water reactors.  For each 
cable type, a sample was aged for three, six, and nine months with one sample left 
unaged.  The six month sample represented a 40-year life assuming activation energies of 
1.15 eV, an ambient temperature of 55 °C, and a cumulative radiation dose of 400 kGy.  
The high temperature steam testing is not required for cable qualification per IEEE-383. 
 Following aging each set of cables was exposed to a loss-of-coolant accident 
(LOCA) simulation.  The LOCA simulation included exposure to accident radiation for 
210 hours and 193 hours for the six and three month samples, respectively.  Following 
the accident radiation exposure, the cables were exposed to a high temperature and 
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pressure steam LOCA environment similar to that given in IEEE-323, “IEEE Standard 
for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.” 
 All of the six month aged cables that survived the LOCA testing were then 
subjected to a submergence test that lasted 1000 hours at 95 °C.  The set of cables aged 
for three months were subjected to the high temperature steam testing consisting of a 
steam exposure at temperatures as high as 400 °C.  Nowlen and Jacobus suggested that 
these steam test results can be applied to cable thermal damageability estimates based on 
the assumption that superheated steam and heated dry air produced consistent results 
(±10 °C) [Nowlen and Jacobus 1992].  However, the purpose of these tests were 
specifically for obtaining some quantitative information on the failure thresholds of cable 
exposed to high temperature steam conditions. 
 During testing, the intended temperature profile for the steam exposure was not 
followed due to complication with the steam system.  The actual profiles are shown in 
Figure 8. 
Figure 8. Pressure and Temperature profile for High Temperature Steam 3-month aged samples 
[Nowlen and Jacobus 1992] 
 
 The failure thresholds reported are presented in Table 2 for each insulation 
material for a 1,000 Ω/100 m and a relaxed 100 Ω /100 m insulation resistance failure 
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criteria.  It is interesting to note that current NRC guidance uses the relaxed failure 
criteria in several of its guidance documents, except for the Kerite-FR material 
[EPRI/NRC-RES 2005, NRC 2005].  A basis for the use of the relaxed criteria could not 
be found. 




Failure Temperature Range (°C) 
IR Failure Criteria 
1,000 Ω/100 m 
IR Failure Criteria 
100 Ω/100 m 
XLPO 13 254-378 299-388 
EPR 16 235-400 370-400 
Silicone Rubber 2 396-400 396-400 
Kerite FR 2 153-171 372-282 
Polyimide 1 399 399 
 
4.2.2.5  Fire Safety Research at Sandia National Laboratories 
 
 Nowlen identifies time to damage data for unprotected cables of the qualified and 
unqualified varieties. A 3/C #12AWG XLPE insulated/jacketed qualified cable failed in 9 
minutes, while a 3/C #12AWG 20/10 PVC/PE insulation and PVC jacket unqualified 
cable failed in 6 minutes when exposed flame region of a 41 kW fire [Nowlen 1989]. 
 Nowlen later evaluated the cable damageability tests done by Lukens and 
developed time to electrical failure plots, presented in Figures 9 and 10 for unqualified 
and qualified cables respectively.  Iqbal and Salley later refined these estimates [Iqbal 
and Salley 2004].  Cables were energized with 320 Vdc and 5 A and monitored for when 
a conductor-to-ground short occurred, indicating failure.  Sub-jacket and air 





Figure 9.  Cable steady-state thermal damageability results for a non-rated PE/PVC 3-conductor 
power cable [Nowlen 1989] 
 
 
Figure 10.  Cable steady-state thermal damageability results for a rated low flame XLPE 3-conductor 
power cable [Nowlen 1989] 
 
4.2.2.6 Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs) 
 
 Iqbal and Salley present a compilation of cable failure threshold and time to 
damage information.  Based on the information collected from NRC sponsored research 
[Nowlen 1989, Nowlen 1991, Jacobus and Fuehrer 1990], testing performed by the 
Tennessee Valley Authority [Salley 2000], and expert opinions from Mowrer, Funk and 
Salley [Budnitz 2002], Iqbal and Salley suggest a failure threshold of 330 °C for 
thermoset and 205 °C for thermoplastic insulated cables [Iqbal and Salley 2004].   
In specifying the thermoset threshold, Salley and Iqbal discredit the test results 
from NUREG/CR-5384 due to the relatively long failure times and early vintage of cable 
tested.  Also disregarded are the XLPO results from the high temperature steam tests as a 
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result of its lack of use in NPPs.  Therefore, the specification of 330 °C is based on the 
performance of the XLPE insulated Rockbestos Firewall III material, a product the 
authors view as a poor performing thermoset material.  The authors made a special 
exception to a cable product identified as Kerite-FR a thermoset material they suggest 
should use the lower thermoplastic failure criteria (205 °C) due to its poor performance. 
The EPRI/NRC-RES fire PRA method uses generally agreed upon threshold 
values for each class of cable insulation (330 °C for thermoset insulated and 205 °C for 
thermoplastic insulated cables).  The fire PRA method also presents the recommended 
thermoset material specific thresholds, as presented in Table 3 [EPRI/NRC-RES 2005]. 











13 299-388 299 
Cross-linked 
Polyethylene 
12 320-388 320 
Ethylene Propylene 
Rubber (EPR) 
16 370-400 370 
Silicone Rubber 2 396-400 396 
Kerite FR 2 372-382 372 
Polyimide or Kapton 1 399 399 
*Includes the specific subclass Cross-linked Polyethylene 
 These values were obtained from equipment qualification testing performed to 
evaluate the performance of electrical cable under submerged and high temperature steam 
environments [Jacobus and Nowlen 1990].  Nowlen and Jacobus suggest that these steam 
test results can be applied to cable thermal damageability estimates based on the 
assumption that superheated steam and heated dry air produced consistent results 
(±10 °C) [Nowlen and Jacobus 1992].  The thermal failure temperatures obtained from 
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the superheated steam experiments corresponded to the electrical cable functionality 
being reduced to an insulation resistance of ≤100 Ω/100 m.   
 A more stringent electrical functionality threshold of ≤1,000 Ω / 100 m may be 
applicable to actual circuit configurations and an evaluation of the electrical failure point 
based on electrical insulation materials may be warranted.  At a ≤1,000 Ω / 100 m 
insulation resistance threshold, the corresponding failure temperature would be lower 
than those specified in Table 3.  This brings into question the NRC guidance specific to 
Kerite-FR cable which used the lower 100 Ω/100 m criteria.  It is unclear as to why the 
more conservative criteria were not used for all cable insulation types from this testing. 
The recommendations for the thermoplastic failure criteria are based on test 
results from PVC and PE insulated cables and expert judgment from Mowrer, Funk and 
Salley [Budnitz 2002].  Their recommendations are consistent among one another and 
tend to imply less uncertainty. 
 Iqbal and Salley also present a synopsis of cable thermal failure data related to the 
time to electrical failure based on constant temperature and constant heat flux 
experiments.  Their results are presented in Equations 2 and 3 and Figure 11 for the time 
to damage estimation based on exposure temperature. 
Thermoplastic cable time to damage (constant temperature) 
1/(time to damage : seconds) = 3.488E-05 x (Temp: °C) - 7.467E-03 Equation 2 
Thermoset cable time to damage (constant temperature) 





Figure 11. Plot of Cable Thermal Damage Curve Exposure Temperature vs. Time to Failures [Iqbal 
and Salley, 2004] 
4.2.2.7 Thermal Aging Effect Testing 
 
 Nowlen stipulated electric cable damageability thermal threshold based on his 
accelerated aging tests on cables to evaluate thermal performance for aged cable samples 
[Nowlen 1991].  Salley later suggested that the aging procedure may have been severe 
enough to change the chemical properties of the cable thus invalidating the results [Salley 
2000].  However, the testing does provide valuable information on unaged (control) cable 
samples of the XLPE and EPR variety.  Nowlen documents the failure threshold of an 
unaged Rockbestos Firewall III, XLPE insulated, Neoprene jacketed, 3/C, #12 AWG, 
600V light power/control cable to be 325-330 °C, and that of a BIW Bostrad 7E EPR 
insulated, CSPE jacketed 2/C, #16 AWG, 600 V instrumentation/signal cable to be 365-
370 °C.  The thermal environment was convective in nature and failures of the cables 
were indicated by clearing a 2 A fuse on a 208 V three phase system.  Nowlen’s 
conclusions indicated that the aging improved the performance of the Rockbestos cable 
(350-365 °C) and decreased the performance of the BIW cable (345-350 °C). 
Time to failure(s)

























4.2.2.8 EPRI/NEI Spurious Actuation of Electrical Circuits Due to Cable Fires 
 
 The first testing project to specifically evaluate fire-induced functional failure 
modes of electrical cable for use in risk applications was jointly sponsored by the EPRI 
and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI).  The testing program evaluated electrical cables 
performance under severe fire conditions to assess the various parameter effects on the 
likelihood of cable hot shorts and their potential to cause spurious actuations.  A follow-
on effort sponsored by EPRI documents an expert elicitation panel evaluation of the 
EPRI/NEI testing results, along with establishing conditional best estimate probabilities 
for spurious operations.  This report provides some general insight on how the tests were 
performed as documented in EPRI Report 1006961, “Spurious Actuation of Electrical 
Circuits Due to Cable Fires: Results of an Expert Elicitation” [EPRI1006961]. 
 The following is a brief description of the EPRI/NEI testing program, 
“Briefly, the test series, carried out in 2001, covered three different types 
of cables: a specific type of armored cable, several types of thermoplastic 
cable, and several types of thermoset control cable. Within these three 
broad types, different cables consisting of different numbers of conductors 
were tested, ranging from single-conductor to eight-conductor cables. 
With the exception of a few instrument cables tested by Sandia National 
Laboratories, all cables tested were control cables, not instrumentation or 
power cables. Eighteen different tests comprised the test matrix. The test 
fire, using a diffusion flame burner, was itself always external to the 
cables being tested, but sometimes the cables were in the direct fire plume 
and sometimes they were in the hot gas layer. The tests concentrated on 
cables in cable trays of differing loadings, but a few tests studied cables in 
conduit. Two tests used cables in a vertical configuration. The tests were 
all conducted in a steel room enclosure, 8 feet high by 10 feet square, with 
a simple opening for external ventilation in one wall, whose vertical 
location varied from test to test. During discussions among the expert 
panelists, it was observed that some of the tests appeared to be 
characterized by limited ventilation. However, it is not known whether this 
had an important influence on the results, expressed in terms of 
temperature measured at the cable or of "cable damage" (however 




 The results from the testing and expert elicitation were subsequently used to 
develop conditional probability of fire-induced spurious operations, given cable damage 
that are found in NUREG/CR-6850 (EPRI TR 1011989), which documents the current 
state-of-the-art methods for performing fire PRA at NPPs.   
 As mentioned previously, the NRC was invited to observe and participate in this 
testing.  The NRC supported this participation by contracting with SNL to instrument 
cables in most of the tests, which provided additional data on fire-induced circuit failures 
and a better characterization of the testing environment.  The information on this work is 
found in NUREG/CR-6776 “Cable Insulation Resistance Measurements Made During 
Cable Tests” [Wyant and Nowlen 2002].  Additionally, Appendix D in NUREG/CR-6834 
“Circuit Analysis – Failure Mode and Likelihood Analysis,” provides details on the 
results of the EPRI/NEI testing [LaChance, Nowlen, Wyant, and Dandini 2003]. 
 Figure 12 provides a plan view of the EPRI/NEI experimental set up.  The 
chamber door opening was 76 cm wide by 2.1 m high in the center of one wall.  This was 
the only vent in the room.  A diffusion sand burner was 30 cm by 30 cm providing a fire 
intensity controlled by a propane flow rate in the range of 70 to 350 kW.  Most of the 
tests used ladder back cable tray formed with a 90 degree bend intended to provide a 
constant physical stress to the cable and conductors.  The cable tray assembly was 
elevated 1.5, 1.8, or 2.1 m above the concrete floor.  A manually activated water sprinkler 
head located in the top corner of the test enclosure was used as needed during the testing 




Figure 12. Plan view of EPRI/NEI test arrangement [Wyant and Nowlen 2002] 
 
 The EPRI/NEI testing used surrogate circuit to monitor the electrical response of 
the fire damaged cables.  These circuits mimicked a motor operated valve circuit 
commonly found in NPPs.  The circuit was connected to the cables exposed to the fire 
conditions such that there were several source and target conductors co-located within the 
same multi-conductor cable and also located among various cables in a cable bundle (see 
Figure 13).  Source conductors are considered any conductor in a cable that is energized 
and can provide electrical power.  Target conductors are any non-energized conductors 
that are connected to an end device or indication lamps.  When a source conductor comes 
in electrical contact with a target conductor, a hot short occurs.  A spurious operation 
occurs when the target conductor was connected to an end device that when energized 
changes state, or when a component such as a motor starts or stops without operation 
action.  The physical circuits themselves were not exposed to any fire conditions.  Each 
cable conductor was monitored for voltage and current response to allow for post test 
evaluation.  Temperature measurements were also made at numerous locations within the 
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cable tray.  Type K thermocouples were placed on the jacket surface and wrapped with 
one layer of fiberglass tape to ensure sufficient thermocouple bead contact with the cable 
jacket surface.  
 
 
Figure 13. EPRI/NEI cable bundle [LaChance, Nowlen, Wyant, and Dandini 2003] 
 
 NRC/SNL fielded two types of circuit diagnostic systems during the EPRI/NEI 
testing.  One system referred to as the insulation resistance measurement system (IRMS) 
measured the electrical resistance between conductors and between conductors and any 
common ground conductive path (cable tray, conduit, other cable conductors, etc.). 
 The second system used was a mock-up instrumentation circuit.  The circuit 
simulated a 4-to-20 mA instrumentation loop commonly used in NPP and monitored the 
degradation of the transmitted signal.  An electrical schematic of the instrumentation loop 
is shown in Figure 14.  A constant current source located on the upper left corner of this 
figure provides a constant 15 mA current source and a voltage transducer located on the 
right of the illustration measure the voltage drop across a known resistance that 
represents an indication dial and allows for the calculation of current on this side of the 
circuit.  Any current measurement less than 15 mA indicates that current was leaking 





Figure 14. Illustration of instrumentation current loop. [Wyant 2002] 
 
The NRC/SNL test circuit results identified two important facts about fire-
induced cable failures.  First it was noted that multi-conductor cables tend to display 
initial failure modes involving intra-cable hot shorts (i.e., shorts between conductors 
within a multi-conductor cable).  Second the failure modes for thermoset and 
thermoplastic instrumentation cables tended to be different.  The thermoplastic cables 
failed abruptly to an off scale low signal, while thermoset instrumentation cables showed 
a gradual loss of current over a finite period.  In real life applications, these thermoset 
type cable failures would cause plant indication (tank level, system pressure, etc.) to 
show that the parameter of interest was decreasing and could result in the operator taking 
inappropriate actions.  Similar failure modes were not observed in the control cable 
testing. 
 The NRC/SNL report identified several phenomena that the author felt required 
further investigation, including comparison between ac and dc failure modes, tray versus 
conduit likelihood of shorting to ground.  Both of these suggestions were evaluated 
during subsequent testing described in section’s 4.2.2.10 and 4.2.2.12.  The author also 
noted that open circuit failure modes were not observed in any test and suggested that 
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these failure modes are not likely to occur at the systems operating voltages (120 Vac, 
100 Vdc). 
4.2.2.9 Determination of Failure Criteria for Electric Cables Exposed to Fire 
For Use in a Nuclear Power Plant Risk Analysis 
 
 Murphy performed radiant cable damage tests using the Sandia National 
Laboratories Penlight apparatus to evaluate failure criteria [Murphy 2004].  The 
experimental program focused on power and control cables including two thermoset 
insulated (EPR, XLPE) cable types.  These cables were exposed to heat fluxes ranging 
from 14 kW/m2 up to 97 kW/m2.  Cable functionality was evaluated using the SNL IRMS 
to measure insulation resistance drop between conductors during the thermal exposure.  
Murphy could not recommend a single cable failure temperature for all cable types, but 
suggested a temperature between 400 and 450 °C for EPR and XLPE insulated cables.  It 
was also noted that regarding relative cable robustness to thermal insult, the EPR cable 
was more robust than the XLPE cable. 
4.2.2.10 SNL Fire-Induced ac Circuit Response Testing (CAROLFIRE) 
 
 The testing programs described in this section and section 4.2.2.12 provide the 
data set that will be evaluated in this thesis.  Current use of the data from these two 
experimental testing programs has been limited to risk-informing fire protection 
inspections and has not yet been used widely to advance the state of the art methods for 
quantifying the risk associated with fires in NPPs.  The data from these two testing 
programs will be used to evaluate the THIEF one-dimension heat conduction model. 
The NRC sponsored Cable Response to Live Fire (CAROLFIRE) testing project 
was conducted by SNL to address two areas of research; namely, provide experimental 
43 
 
data to support resolution of regulatory concerns identified as ‘Bin 2’ circuit failure items 
in NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2004-03 Revision 1, “Risk-informed Approach to 
Post-fire Safe-Shutdown Circuit Inspections,” and to improve fire modeling techniques to 
reduce uncertainty in predictions of cable response to fires.  Small-scale radiant and 
intermediate-scale diffusion flame exposures were used on a variety of power, control, 
and instrumentation cables.  The cables were monitored for thermal and electrical 
response.  The small-scale testing monitored electrical cable functionality using the 
IRMS, while the intermediate-scale tests used the IRMS and a surrogate circuit designed 
to mimic an NPP alternating current (ac) motor operated valve (MOV) motor starter 
circuit [Nowlen and Wyant 2008]. 
 A small-scale radiant exposure apparatus, known as the “Penlight,” was used, as 
pictured in Figure 15, with an illustration shown in Figure 16.  A horizontal hollow 
cylindrical inconel metal shroud acted as a gray body radiator that was heated by 0.61m 
long liquid cooled quarts lamps which surround the exterior of the shroud.  The shroud 
had a 0.514 m inside diameter and was 0.813 m long.  The test specimen (cables) were 
placed in the center of the shroud, along with any cable raceway supports, and exposed to 
the well control symmetrical radiant heat flux.  The temperature and heat flux emitted 
from the shroud was nominally uniform over the central 0.61 m heated portion of the 
shroud surface.  For the temperatures used in testing, the shroud emissivity was 
approximately 0.81-0.82 [Nowlen and Wyant 2008].  Insulation covers are placed on the 




Figure 15. Photograph of Penlight small-scale radiant heat apparatus shown during startup testing 
for the DESIREE-Fire project, without cables in apparatus [Nowlen and Wyant 2008] 
 
 
Figure 16. Small-scale radiant exposure apparatus 
 
 Nowlen provides temperature profiles of the inconel shroud in NUREG/CR-6931 
Volume 2, showing that “the most intense exposure was at the center of the shroud’s 
axial dimension (half way through the horizontal cylinder)” [Nowlen and Wyant 2008].  
This indicates that the cables thermal exposure was greatest at the center for the shroud 
radial axis and was likely the location of cable failure.  Factors that affect the uniformity 
of the cable exposure conditions included the shroud end conditions, raceway shadowing 
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effect, and cable location within chamber.  The shroud ends were closed using 24 mm 
thick low-density solid refractory insulation board material.  These end covers were used 
to reduce convective losses but did not provide a perfect seal around cables and cable 
raceways.  The insulating ends were not heated during any of the tests.  This causes the 
temperature profile to drop off near the end of the cylinder.  Cable trays and rigid steel 
conduits were used during penlight tests.  Both raceway types provided some level of 
shadowing the incident heat flux from the shroud.  In the conduit case, the conduit acted 
as a secondary shroud that heated up from the penlight exposure and subsequently heated 
the cables within the conduit by radiation and conduction.  The cable tray sides and rungs 
also shadowed the heat flux of the shroud but due to the open ladder back type cable trays 
used, the majority of the cables surface area was still in direct line of sight with the 
penlight shroud.  The penlight exposure was controlled using a feedback loop that used a 
thermocouple shroud temperature measurement taken horizontal from the radial and axial 
center of the shroud.  For the exposures used in CAROLFIRE, constant heat fluxes were 
used for all penlight tests.  The penlight apparatus typically reached steady state 
conditions within 120 seconds. 
 An intermediate-scale testing apparatus was used to provide more realistic flame 
exposure conditions without the costs and time demands associated with full-scale 
testing.  The intermediate-scale apparatus was based off of the ASTM E603 standard 
room fire facility with slight modifications.  Figure 17 presents a diagram of the testing 
apparatus.  The test apparatus was 0.6 m higher than the standard fire room size and had 
the bottom 1.8 m open to allow sufficient ventilation to eliminate the possibly of oxygen-
limited combustion, a defect that apparently occurred during the NEI/EPRI testing 
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[Wyant and Nowlen 2002].  The top 1.2 m was enclosed, including the ceiling, with a 
gypsum type material to allow the development of a hot gas layer.  As Figure 17 shows, 
there were numerous cable exposure locations in the apparatus labeled A-G to provide 
flame, plume, and hot gas layer exposure conditions within one test.  The entire 
intermediate-scale assembly was located within a larger room to reduce environmental 
effects, however the room configuration did not allow for oxygen consumption 
calorimetry.  A surrogate circuit simulating an ac motor starter contractor, commonly 
used in MOV circuits, was instrumented to monitor voltage and current on all cable 
conductors.  The IRMS system was also used. 
 
 
Figure 17. Intermediate-scale diffusion flame exposure apparatus [Nowlen and Wyant 2008] 
 
 Both scales of testing instrumented the cables similarly for thermal response.  
Type K (Chromel-Alumel) thermocouples were used in all tests, with bare-bead Teflon 
insulated TC’s typically used to measure cable jacket surface and air temperatures and 
stainless steel sheathed ungrounded TC’s used for measuring sub-jacket and cable core 
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temperatures.  Nowlen notes the difficulty of measuring cable jacket surface temperatures 
due to the struggle to maintain the thermocouple bead in contact with the cables surface 
during testing as the cable tends to swell and blister when heated [Nowlen and Wyant 
2008].  Cable surface thermocouples were attached to the jacket with one and a half 
wraps of 3M fiberglass tape, ensuring that only one layer of tape was between the 
thermocouple bead and air.  This configuration is not ideal as the tape adds an additional 
barrier between the bead and exposure environment, but was done to try and achieve 
consistent temperature results.  Sub-jacket thermocouples were used to measure the cable 
temperature just below the cable jacket material to characterize the temperature profile of 
the cable conductor insulation.  To achieve a representative measurement, an incision was 
made 20-30 cm from where the thermocouple bead was desired to be located.  Then the 
thermocouple was inserted into the incision and slide along the conductors just below the 
cable jacket.  The distance a thermocouple could be slide under the jacket was depending 
on the cable construction.  After the sub-jacket thermocouples were inserted, the incision 
was closed by wrapping with fiberglass tape.  Figure 18 provides an illustration of sub-
jacket thermocouple placement.  Thermocouple measurements were taken at 100 hertz 
with a simple average of 100 samples recorded every second.  
 











 Cable electrical response was monitored using an identical but separate cable 
from the thermocouple instrumented cable.  This was done to eliminate the possibility of 
interference from the metallic thermocouple leads and the electrical conductors.  The 
ends of the cables were connected to either the IRMS or surrogate circuits using wing 
nuts. 
 As previously mentioned, two electrical circuit systems were used to test for cable 
electrical functionality.  The IRMS measures the electrical resistance between conductors 
and between conductors and any common ground conductive path (cable tray, conduit, 
other cable conductors, etc.).  The surrogate circuit mimics an ac motor starter circuit, 
measuring conductor current and voltage throughout the test.  These measurements were 
used to identify when hot shorts and shorts to ground occur. 
 The IRMS system is patented by SNL and an illustrative schematic of the IRMS 
is shown in Figure 19.  The switch/controller systematically toggles through the 
conductive paths allowing a single conductive path to become energized, while another 
conductive path is connected to ground (common return of power supply).  The voltage 
polarity is then switched between conductive paths and the two measured voltages across 
the ballast resistor are used to calculate the resistance using ohms law. 




Figure 19. Simplified electrical schematic of IRMS for 3/C cable with ground monitoring [Wyant 
2002] 
 
One defect of the IRMS measuring process is that the cycle time increases 
exponentially as the number of monitored conductors’ increases.  A method to reduce this 
cycle time was to gang groups of alternating conductors together into one measurement 
channel.  This method is illustrated in Figure 20.  Although the detail of conductor failure 
was reduced, the overall evaluation of cable failure was preserved. 
 
 
Figure 20. Illustration of ganging cable conductors into groups to monitor cable response 
 
 The second system used by SNL to monitor circuit electrical response to fire-
induced cable failure was the surrogate circuit diagnostic units (SCDUs) which mimicked 
an ac MOV circuit.  Figure 21shows a schematic of the SCDU.  When the SCDU was 
connected to a control cable there are two source paths (labeled 1 and 2) that can provide 
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electrical potential, three target paths (labeled 4, 5, and 6) that can become energized if 
shorted to the source conductors, one spare conductor path (labeled 8), and one return 
conductor path (labeled 7) that was connected directly to the return side of the power 
supply.  The power supply for the SCDUs were typically a control power transformers 
(CPTs) and could be grounded or ungrounded depending on the desired testing 
configuration.  For the majority of the tests, the CPTs were grounded as this was typically 
practice for NPP ac MOV circuits.  Each conductive path of the SCDU was monitored for 
current and voltage.  These measurements were used for post test evaluation  of the cable 
failure modes. 
 
Figure 21. SCDU ac MOV circuit  
 
 In total, 96 tests were conducted in CAROLFIRE, including 78 tests using the 
small-scale radiant exposure apparatus and the IRMS collecting data to support fire 
model advancements. Eighteen intermediate-scale tests were conducted using the SCDU 
and IRMS to collect data on the cable failure modes in support of resolving the regulatory 
issue.  Both testing scales provided severe thermal exposure conditions to ensure that the 
cables would experience failure, in order to provide information on the fire-induced 
51 
 
failure modes.  Thus, these experiments were not intended to provide information on 
determining the probability of cable damage (Ped,j|i). 
 A secondary objective of CAROLFIRE was to improve fire modeling of cable 
damage.  Volume 3 of NUREG/CR-6931, “Thermally-Induced Electrical Failure 
(THIEF) model” documents this effort.  The report concludes that the THIEF model “has 
been shown to work effectively in realistic fire environments” and while various 
refinements could be made, it is unlikely that any enhancements would dramatically 
improve its overall accuracy, in light of the uncertainties associated with fire modeling of 
the entire fire compartment [McGrattan 2008].  The THIEF model makes several 
assumptions that allow for a simple numerical solution of the one-dimensional heat 
conduction equation with a homogenous cylinder with fixed temperature-independent 
properties.  The THIEF model assumptions, governing equations and numerical approach 
are discussed next. 
4.2.2.11 The THIEF model for predicting cable damage 
 
 Petra Andersson and Patrick Van Hees of the Swedish National Testing and 
Research Institute initially presented a model to predict cable damage.  It predicts cable 
damage via a simple one-dimensional heat transfer calculation, under the assumptions 
that the cable can be treated as a homogenous cylinder [Anderson and Van Hees 2005].  
NRC sponsored research at NIST resulted in the refinement of the Swedish model into 
what has become known as the THIEF model.  The specific assumptions that allow the 
THIEF model to work are as stated in NUREG/CR-6931, Volume 3: 
 
Assumption 1. Heat penetration into a cable of circular cross section is largely in the 
radial direction.  
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- This assumption greatly simplifies the analysis, and is conservative 
because it is assumed that the cable is completely surrounded by the 
heat source. 
Assumption 2. The cable is homogenous in composition.   
-  In reality, a cable is constructed of several different types of 
polymeric materials, cellulosic fillers, and a conducting metal, most 
often copper. 
Assumption 3. The thermal properties – conductivity, specific heat, and density – of 
the assumed homogenous cable are independent of temperature.   
- In reality, both the thermal conductivity and specific heat of polymers 
are temperature-dependent, but this information is very difficult to 
obtain from manufacturers. 
Assumption 4. It is assumed that no decomposition reactions occur within the cable 
during its heating, and ignition and burning are not considered in the 
model.   
- In fact, thermoplastic cables melt, thermoset form a char layer, and 
both off-gas volatiles up to and beyond the point of electrical failure. 
Assumption 5. Electrical failure occurs when the temperature just inside the cable 
jacket reaches an experimentally determined value. 
- Functional failure of electrical cable occurs when conductor insulation 




 From these assumptions, the governing equation for multi-dimensional unsteady 
heat transfer for the cable temperature, T(r,t) are: 
 
  Equation 5 
 
where ρ, c, and k are the effective density, specific heat, and conductivity of the solid, all 
assumed constant.  The boundary condition at the exterior boundary, r=R are given by: 
 
 "  Equation 6 
 
where " is the assumed axially-symmetric heat flux to the exterior surface of the cable.  
Fire modeling or fire analysis provides the heat flux information for the thermal 
environment of the fire compartment where the cable target is located. 
 As the THIEF model is only a one-dimensional heat transfer calculation, it can 
only predict the interior temperature and infer electrical failure when a user specified 
failure temperature is reached.  A result of electrical cable construction and heat transfer 
to the cable from an exterior source, the centermost point of the cable is not necessarily 
the indicator of electrical failure.  Instead, the conductors nearest to the exterior of the 
cable will have their insulation degrade first and it is this temperature, just beneath the 
cable overall protective jacket that is of importance when determining the cable 
temperature associated with cable electrical failure. 
 Using threshold failure temperatures of 400 °C for thermoset cables and 200 °C 
for thermoplastic cables, McGrattan used THIEF to predict time to damage values and 
compare these results to the experimentally measured time to damage failures.  These 
threshold values differ from those proposed by Iqbal and Salley and were used because 
the CAROLFIRE experimental results indicated that thermoplastic cables failed 
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electrically when their sub-jacket temperature reached somewhere between 200 and 
250 °C and for thermoset cables between 400 and 450 °C [McGrattan 2008].  The results 
indicated that the THIEF model under-predicted the time to damage by 3 % on average 
with a standard deviation of 20 % [McGrattan 2008].  These prediction models runs were 
conducted in Fire Dynamics Simulator.  NRC has subsequently implemented the THIEF 
model into its FDTs Microsoft Excel™ spreadsheets.  The FDTs THIEF model requires 
several input parameters, such as cable properties (cable diameter, cable mass per unit 
length, cable jacket thickness), cable failure threshold, cable raceway type, along with the 
exposing gas temperature profile.  The temperature profile can be user defined or it can 
be calculated based on several of the other FDTs models (MQH, FPA, etc.).  Cable 
specific parameters used in this thesis are presented in Section 5.3. 
 In fire PRA applications, it is important to know how long it will take a particular 
fire scenario to damage a target cable.  The THIEF model can provide the time to damage 
based on the calculated thermal environment as an input.  Any error or uncertainties 
associated with the thermal environment prediction will be carried through the THIEF 
model.  As presented by McGrattan, the THIEF model predictions are only as accurate as 
the input thermal exposing conditions.  Thus if the MQH hot gas layer calculation was 
used as the exposing temperature profile input to the THIEF model, any uncertainty 
(error) from the MQH calculation are carried through the THIEF calculation [McGrattan 
2008].   
4.2.2.12 SNL Fire-Induced dc Circuit Response Testing (DESIREE-FIRE) 
 
 The NRC and EPRI working under a memorandum of understanding sponsored a 
follow-on project to CAROLFIRE, namely, the Direct Current Electrical Shorting in 
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Response to Exposure Fire (DESIREE-Fire) testing project performed by SNL.  This 
testing focused mostly on the failure modes of direct current (dc) powered control 
circuits.  The same thermal testing apparatus were used as in CAROLFIRE, however 
only surrogate circuits were used to diagnose the fire-induced electrical cable failure 
modes (i.e., no IRMS).  These surrogate circuits were based on NPP circuit designs for dc 
powered 1) motor operated valves, 2) small pilot solenoid operated valves, 3) small direct 
acting solenoid operated valve, 4) large direct acting solenoid operated coil assembly, and 
5) medium voltage circuit breaker control circuits.  The circuit simulators used for the dc 
circuits were similar to the ac SCDU MOV system with the exception of using different 
current and voltage transducers to measure dc signals and a different power source. 
 All dc test circuits were powered from the same nominal 125 Vdc power source.  
This source was from a Class 1E battery bank with approximately 13,000 A short circuit 
fault current capability.  This source was sought to be realistic of actual NPP dc power 





Figure 22. Photo of nominal 125Vdc battery bank used as power source in dc circuit testing. Photo is 
prior to terminal connection and located in climate controlled sea container. 
 
 A schematic diagram of the dc MOV circuit simulator is shown in Figure 23.  All 
of the dc circuits differed from the ac circuits in that they were intentionally left 
ungrounded and two fuses were used in each circuit.  Both of these characteristics are 
representative of typical dc circuits used in NPPs.  The schematic diagrams for the other 





Figure 23. dc MOV circuit simulator schematic 
 
 One complicating factor associated with the circuit setup used was that the power 
source was left ungrounded, however the voltage transducers required a reference 
potential.  Rather than referencing them to battery negative voltage potential, the 
transducers were connected to electrical ground.  In addition, a ground monitoring circuit 
consisting of two 10 kΩ resistors in series connected across the battery potential with the 
center tap of the series resistors connected to ground provided two benefits.  First, voltage 
transducers connected across each resistor of the ground monitoring circuit could be used 
to identify when either side of the battery shorted to ground via cable conductor short to 
ground.  Second, the voltage transducer signal were used in the data processing phase to 
baseline the individual conductor voltage signals which cleaned up the voltage signal and 
allowed for easier interpretation of the voltage results without interference from 
conductor shorts to ground.  Figure 24 provides an illustration of the voltage plot before 
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and after the baseline data processing.  The ground monitoring circuit is illustrated in 
Figure 25. 
 
Figure 24. Illustration of benefit to base-lining the conductor voltage data. 
 
 
Figure 25. Ground fault monitoring circuit 
 
 In general, the DESIREE-Fire results indicated that failure modes for dc operated 
circuits, as compared to ac powered circuits, were more energetic, lasted longer in 
duration, and were the only cases where open circuiting as a primary failure mode was 
observed.  The report presented the results in a very simplistic manner and did not 
provide any analysis on the results, other than the general observations previously stated 
[Nowlen, Brown, Olivier, Wyant 2012].  In particular, the SNL report was inconclusive 
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as to how fire PRA should address the duration of spurious operations.  For instance, 
should the fire PRA assume a dc fire-induced circuit spurious operation last for a long 
time (i.e., not clear) or should some duration limit be used.  The SNL work didn’t include 
any evaluation of multiple cable shorts to ground that can result in hot short induced 
spurious operations when a common ungrounded power supply was used. 
The NRC sponsored DESIREE-Fire tests used an ungrounded common power 
supply to energize all circuit tested.  To evaluate the data for these failure mechanisms, 
the data for individual conductor voltage and current plots were used to understand which 
conductors are involved.  Voltage alone does not provide sufficient information to 
identify which conductor is supplying the energy (source conductors) and which 
conductors are receiving the energy (target conductors).   
Fuse operability status becomes beneficial in ruling out potential source circuits.  
When a circuit fuse clears, the portion of the circuit associated with the cleared fuse is no 
longer capable of performing its function and thus was no longer of concern for 
involvement with ground fault equivalent spurious operation.  The dc test circuits had 
two fuses per circuit, one on the positive and one on the negative side of the circuit power 
leads and simultaneous clearing of both fuses did not always occur.  In about one-half of 
the tests only one fuse of a particular circuit would clear.  This single fuse clearing would 
cause one side of the circuit to remain functional and a potential target or source of 
multiple short to ground failure mode.  When a circuit’s positive battery side fuse cleared, 
its source conductors were no longer considered a source, likewise, when a circuit’s 
negative fuse cleared the circuit’s target conductors were no longer considered targets 
(i.e., a hot short to target conductors could no longer cause a circuit to respond).  With 
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this particular configuration, it is important to acknowledge that if only one of the two 
circuits fuses clear then the circuit can still experience inter-cable shorting faults, that can 
cause spurious operations.  Figure 26 presents a schematic diagram illustrating two 
circuits experiencing a multiple short to ground spurious operation.  Here, Circuit A has 
experienced a fuse clear (represented by the X) on the positive battery voltage side of the 
circuit resulting in the de-energization of Circuit A source conductors “P” and “G.”  In 
short, Circuit A can no longer supply energy to cause a spurious operation.  Circuit B has 
experienced a fuse clear on the negative battery voltage side of the circuit resulting in the 
target conductors “YC1”, and “YO1”no longer being able to support a spurious 
operation.  However, one portion of each circuit has a fuse that remains operable.  As 
shown in Figure 26, if conductor(s) “P” or “G” of Circuit B shorts to ground and 
conductor(s) “YC1” or “YO1” of Circuit A short to ground, a multiple short to ground 
spurious operation will occur, provided that the shorts are of low impedance. 
 
Figure 26. Illustration of possible combination for ground fault equivalent hot short induced 
spurious operation showing a target conductor (YC1) shorting to ground in Circuit A and source 
conductor in Circuit B shorting to ground.  Loss of only one fuse on each circuit does not eliminate 
possibility of ground equivalent hot short. 
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The ungrounded battery supply also complicates the evaluation of the data for 
inter-cable shorting.  By having the dc battery ungrounded (which is common practice in 
NPPs), a single short to ground from a conductor of positive or negative battery potential 
would not cause a fuse to clear.  In order to cause a fuse clear, either direct plus to minus 
conductor shorts would be required or multiple shorts to a ground plane (plus and minus) 
of sufficiently low resistance to cause a fuse clear.   
A review of the ac test data will not identify these multiple short to ground inter-
cable spurious operations, because no more than one circuit was left ungrounded in any 
test.  This eliminated the possibility of observing these events.  In ac tests the control 
power transformer (CPT) secondary winding was typically grounded (as is done in a 
majority of NPPs) and any energized conductor experiencing a low resistance short to the 
reference ground (due to fire damage) would experience a high current rush resulting in 
clearing an upstream protective device (fuse or circuit breaker) and de-energizing the 
circuit. 
4.4  Probability Estimation of Spurious Operation, and General 
Conclusions on Literature Survey 
 
4.4.1  Risk Studies and Methods 
 
4.4.1.1 Early Fire Risk Analysis of NPPs 
 
 Early fire risk analysis studies done by Kazarians and Apostolakis argue that there 
should be three frequencies: 1) the frequency of cable failure given that it is exposed to 
flames, 2) the fraction of these failures that lead to a certain failure mode, and 3) the 
duration of the failure mode [Kazarians and Appostolakis 1981].  In an attempt to address 
the second frequency, they note that data on “hot shorts” are very sketchy, but given the 
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spurious starts of the emergency core cooling system during the Browns Ferry Fire in the 
first half hour, the fraction of cable damage failures leading to a certain failure mode is a 
significant frequency on the order of 0.1 or larger for wire in a multi-conductor cable to 
touch one another before touching ground. 
4.4.1.2 Conditional Probability of Spurious Operation Likelihood Estimate, Task 10, 
NUREG/CR-6850 
 
 The current state of the art method for performing a fire probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) is contained in a joint NRC/EPRI report, “EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA 
Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities.”  The method consists of a multistep iterative 
process to calculate overall plant risk from fire.  Task 10 of the EPRI/NRC-RES Fire 
PRA methodology provides instruction on estimating the probability of hot short failure 
modes of interest.  Typically, spurious operations are the failure mode of interest because 
they can cause maloperation of plant equipment that can lead to core damage or 
complicate the ability of the plant operators to achieve and maintain the plant in a safe-
shutdown condition.  The EPRI/NRC-RES document presents two methods of evaluation.  
A table lookup methods presents likelihood estimates for simplistic circuit 
configurations, based on the results of the EPRI/NEI tests.  The second method uses a 
formula based on the cable conductor-to-circuit configuration.  The formula was 
developed from the results of the EPRI/NEI test data.  The guidance document suggests 
using the table method for simple circuit configurations such as those tested and the 
formula method for complex configurations. 
PFM = CF x PCC 
CF = {CT x [CS + m(0.5/CTot)]} / CTot 




PFM = The probability that a specific hot short failure mode of interest will occur  
PCC = The probability that a conductor-to-conductor short will occur prior to a 
short-to-ground or short to a grounded conductor 
CF = A configuration factor applied to Pcc to account for the relative number of 
source and target conductors. 
CTot = total number of conductors in the cable of interest, including spares 
CG =  number of grounded or power supply common conductors in the cable of 
interest 
CS =  number of source conductors in the cable of interest 
CT =  number of target conductors in the cable of interest 
n =  1 for cable trays, 3 for conduits, and 0 for ungrounded systems 
m =  1 for non-armored cables, 0 for armored cables 
 
 In the look-up table method, five tables are presented.  Tables 10-1 and 10-2 
present thermoset while Tables 10-3 and 10-4 present thermoplastic cable best estimate 
point probabilities for circuits with and without a CPT.  A fifth table presents the best 
estimate point probabilities for cables with armor or shields.  The tables show that the use 
of CPTs reduce the probability by a factor of two, while a cable in a tray is four time 
more likely to experience a hot short than when located in a conduit.  A summary of 
pertinent information is presented in Table 4. 
Table 4. Summary of multi-conductor information presented in NUREG/CR-6850 EPRI TR1011989 
Cable Type CPT Raceway Type 



































4.4.2 General conclusions on the use of historical cable fire test data 
 
Based on the information available and reviewed, the following conclusions can 
be made on historical cable fire testing: 
• Cable failure times have ranged from 1.0 to 20 minutes; in some cases 
cables did not fail. 
• Cable failure criteria are not consistent among tests (ignition, short to 
ground, conductor-to-conductor short, physical cable degradation, etc.) 
• There is no standard method to determine the loss of electrical cable 
functionality due to severe thermal exposure. 
• Limited variation of fire incident characteristics, will limit the 
applicability of statistical use of the results to represent a wide variety of 
plant fire scenarios. 
• Different fire tests have resulted in contradictory conclusions  
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5 Data Analysis 
 
 This section documents the use of the recent NRC sponsored fire test data to; 
• evaluate cable minimum thermal failure threshold (section 5.1) 
• development cable thermal fragility distributions (section 5.2) 
• evaluate the FDTs THIEF model prediction capabilities  (section 5.3) 
• evaluate influence parameter effects on fire-induced circuit failure modes 
(section 5.4) 
• evaluate the dc test data to identify spurious operations caused by multiple cable 
conductor shorts to ground (section 5.5). 
 
 Some of the highest quality data on fire-induced cable failure modes available in 
open literature were from the NRC sponsored fire testing (CAROLFIRE and DESIREE-
Fire).  These experimental programs were discussed in detail in section 4.  However, the 
information collected through these two projects have only been used to address specific 
regulatory concerns.  As such, the data has not been thoroughly reviewed to understand 
the thermal damageability limits of the electrical cables tested or specific circuit failure 
characteristics.  Therefore, the data from these two test projects were the sole subject of 
the evaluation conducted in this thesis. 
For each NRC sponsored test, a corresponding Microsoft® Excel data file(s) were 
available containing time stamped thermocouple, voltage and current transducer 
measurements.  All measurements were made at sampling intervals on the order of less 
than one second.  Using the information provided from the NRC sponsored testing, a 
Microsoft® Excel “database” was developed.  The database was populated with test 
information from the NUREG/CR test reports and the electronic data files.  The database 
allowed for the information to be sorted by parameter.  For each test, the database was 
populated with the following information; 
• time to damage 
• failure mode type (hot short, spurious actuation, fuse clear, open circuit) 
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• duration of hot shorts and/or spurious operations 
• temperature measurement(s) at time of first electrical failure 
o sub-jacket 
o air 
o penlight shroud (if applicable) 
• cable configuration 
o cable conductor count 
o conductor size (in American Wire Gauge [AWG]) 
o insulation/jacket material (chemical composition) 
o insulation/jacket type (thermoplastic, thermoset) 
o special cable features (shield, armor, drain wire) 
• thermal exposure condition (flame, plume, hot gas layer, radiant) 
• raceway routing configuration 
o raceway type (conduit, tray, air drop) 
o cable orientation (vertical, horizontal) 
o raceway fill 
• circuit characteristics 
o circuit fusing size 
o power supply (ac, dc) 
o power supply type (control power transformer, line, battery) 
o circuit grounding configuration 
o number source conductors vs. target conductors 
The time to damage was identified from the data as the first occurrence of any 
fire-induced circuit fault (fuse clear, hot short, or a short to ground) for the specific cable 
under evaluation.  These failure modes were determined from conductor voltage 
thresholds identified in Table 5.  These voltage thresholds correspond to the minimum 
voltage required to cause the associated device to operate as identified in the 
corresponding test reports.  The time to damage information was entered into the 
database and then cross referenced with the test reports to ensure the database entries 












Positive Fuse Clear Negative Fuse Clear 
ac MOV > 72 V > 80 V <10 V N/A 
dc MOV 29-89 V* 20-89 V* 
Positive Conductor 
<10 V 
Negative conductor  
>100 V 
dc SOV >56 V >60 V 
dc 1-inch valve >48 V >100 V 








 Conductor G 
Status 
>100 V 
* spurious operation of dc MOV was determined by contactor dependent pickup voltage. 
 
Next, the thermocouple measurements at the time of damage were entered into the 
database.  These measurements included air temperatures near the electrically monitored 
cable, sub-jacket temperatures, and shroud temperature (if applicable). 
 To allow for an evaluation of the effect different thermal exposure conditions had 
on the cables failure mode, cable locations within the experimental configuration were 
grouped into different categories.  All Penlight tests were assigned a “radiant” exposure 
condition due to the highly radiative heat transfer environment of this apparatus.  For the 
intermediate-scale testing cables located in position A (refer to Figure 17) were assigned 
a “flame” exposure condition because the cables were immersed in the flame region for 
the duration of the test.  Cables in locations C and F were assigned a “plume” exposure 
because they were immersed in the fire driven buoyant plume.  The other cable locations 
B, D, E, and G were assigned a “hot gas layer” exposure due to the rapid development of 
a optically thick hot gas layer during testing.  The remainder of the information populated 
into the database was taken directly from the test reports. 
 Not all data from the NRC sponsored tests were of value for the evaluation 
conducted here.  For instance, cable that did not experience functional failures did not 
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provide any information regarding cable failure modes.  This information was not 
included.  Each section that follows, identifies the data used and provides explanations of 
any data that was removed from the evaluation. 
5.1 Minimum Thermal Failure Threshold  
 
 This section evaluates the NRC fire-induced cable failure data specifically 
looking at the sub-jacket cable temperatures at the time electrical cables functional failure 
occurs.  For this evaluation, the small-scale Penlight radiant tests provided the most 
conservative information pertaining to the failure temperature of electrical cables.  
Penlight’s well controlled thermal environment produces consistent results, and 
uncertainty associated with larger intermediate-scale tests (i.e., cable ignition, 
combustion efficiency, active fuel load, etc.) is minimized.  Thus the small-scale radiant 
test results are used to provide empirical evidence to define thermal failure damage 
thresholds based on the minimum failure temperature at electrical failure. 
 Data removed for this evaluation included any test where the cable experienced a 
functional failure after the cable had ignited and sustained burning.  This was done to 
reduce uncertainty regarding the sub-jacket temperature measurement.  When the cable 
ignited, the cable jacket materials were being consumed and depending on material type, 
the thermocouple was no longer reliably measuring the sub-jacket temperature.  As the 
cable polymer material degrades, it become more likely that the thermocouple bead was 
measuring other effects than the sub-jacket materials temperature.  The thermocouple 
bead measurement would likely be influenced by a combination of flame radiation, 
exposure radiation, hot gas convection, soot deposits, etc.  Thus, to provide a reliable 
temperature measurement, all test data where cable ignition occurred prior to an electrical 
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functional failure were removed from further use in the evaluation of cable insulation 
specific cable failure thresholds. 
 Sub-jacket thermocouple measurements for ac and dc Penlight test results at the 
point of first electrical functional failure are shown in Figure 27.  The figure separates the 
data by cable insulation type (TS, TP) and each insulation type was separated by circuit 
power classifications (ac, dc).  The separation of ac data and dc data was done to 
determine if circuit power type has any effect on the thermal failure threshold of the 
cable.  The majority of the test data was from 7-conductor control cables.   
 
Figure 27. Cable Sub-Jacket Thermal Failure Observations Small-Scale (Radiant) Tests 
 
 Figure 27 clearly illustrates the poor performance of Kerite FR as a thermoset 
material.  The poor performance is also consistent with recent NRC guidance on the 
treatment of Kerite-FR cable documented in NRC NFPA frequently asked question 
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(FAQ) 08-0053, “Close-out of National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 
Frequently Asked Question 08-0053, ‘Kerite-FR Cable Failure Thresholds’ [Klein 
2012].”   The thermoset EPR and  XLPE data have similar failure ranges.  The data from 
the thermoplastic cable samples indicates that the PVC is the least robust and PE is the 
most robust, with Tefzel failures more representative of the PE insulated cable. 
One reason the DESIREE-Fire tests were conducted was to determine if the 
duration of fire-induced hot shorts of dc powered control circuits differed from control 
circuits powered from an ac source.  The ac waveform crosses the zero voltage/current 
axis twice per cycle (120 times per minute for 60 Hz power systems).  The dc waveform 
was a constant voltage/current and does not cross the zero axis.  Thus, it was thought that 
the lack of the zero axis crossing would reduce the likelihood of a short circuit 
extinguishing itself.  The results indicated that this lack of zero axis crossing along with 
the larger fuse sizes used in dc control circuits resulted in spurious operation durations 
that were longer than durations observed in ac control circuits.  However, the DESIREE-
Fire test report did not evaluate the effect, if any, that the power source has on 
influencing the cable failure temperature. 
To determine if the circuit power source type (ac or dc) had any effect on the 
thermal failure threshold, a two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) statistical test was 
conducted for each insulation type (XLPE, EPR, PVC, PE) using Matlab R2011b.  The 
Matlab K-S test compares the distributions of the values in the two data vector (ac, dc).  
The null hypothesis is that both data vectors are from the same continuous distribution, as 
indicated by an ‘h’ value of 0 and a ‘p’ value greater than the significance level of 5 % 
[MathWorks 2012].  The K-S tests confirmed that the ac and dc data for each cable 
71 
 
insulation material (XLPE, EPR, PVC and PE) can be combined.  Therefore, the power 
source type (ac or dc) had no effect on the thermal failure thresholds of the cable 
insulation materials from these two test programs. 
Next two sample K-S tests was conducted to determine if the thermoset cable 
types (XLPE, EPR, Kerite-FR) could be combined into one data set (thermoset), as well 
as the thermoplastic cable types (PE, PVC, TEF) combined into another data set 
(thermoplastic).  The TP materials did not pass the K-S test due to the bulk of the PVC 
cables failing at lower temperatures than the PE insulated cables.  The K-S test results 
indicated that the data from the TEF cable type could not be combined into either PE or 
PVC data sets.  Thus, this evaluation indicated that the thermoplastic cable types should 
be evaluated independently.  For the TS material, EPR and XLPE could be pooled, but 
Kerite-FR could not. Therefore, when developing cable thermal fragility distributions in 
section 5.2, a distribution for TS insulation materials (XLPE, EPR) and two distributions 
for TP insulation materials (PVC and PE) were developed. 
 Based on the sub-jacket thermal failure data obtained from the NRC sponsored 
testing, Table 6 was populated.  This table identifies the range, minimum, mean, and 
standard deviation of failure temperatures for each cable insulation material tested as well 
as for the combined TS class of cables.  Because of the Kerite-FR low thermal failure 
threshold observed in the NRC sponsored testing and the current EPRI/NRC-RES fire 
PRA guidance to use the thermoplastic threshold for Kerite-FR, it was not included in the 









Failure Temperature (°C) 
 Range Minimum Mean StDev 
TS 
XLPE 335-535 335 435 33.5 
EPR 364-521 364 431 46.5 
TS* 335-535 335 434 38.0 
TP 
PE 202-471 202 311 81.9 
PVC 163-320 163 220 32.7 
Tefzel 289-384 289 311 31.5 
Other Kerite-FR 249-410 249 284 51.6 
* Does not include Kerite-FR 
 
5.1.1 Evaluation of Minimum Failure Threshold Results 
 
 Current NRC guidance uses minimum empirical cable failure temperatures to 
represent a single point failure criteria to use in risk-informed performance-based 
methods.  Section 5.1 identifies the NRC sponsored test cables sub-jacket temperatures at 
the time of electrical functional failure.  Using these minimum failure temperatures, a 
comparison is made to current guidance and historical test data. 
 The NRC sponsored data set included three thermoset materials; XLPE, EPR, and 
Kerite-FR.  The minimum failure temperature observed for the XLPE insulated cable was 
335 °C.  This result compared well to the current NRC insulation specific guidance of 
320 °C and Nowlen’s finding of 325 °C for XLPE.  These findings suggested that the 
NRC use of XLPE failure data to bound cables with thermoset insulation material from a 
fire exposure damage standpoint seems to be valid given that the generic thermoset 
threshold was 330 °C and the other thermoset material (EPR) failed at temperatures 
above 370 °C. 
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The minimum failure temperature for an EPR insulated cable was identified as 
370 °C from the NRC sponsored testing.  This result corresponded well to Nowlen’s 
baseline aging tests of an EPR insulated cable which failed as low as 365 °C.  NRC 
guidance documents suggest a thermal threshold value of 370 °C for EPR.  One outlier 
from this EPR failure threshold was identified from the high temperature steam testing 
conducted by Jacobus and Fuehrer.  Their testing indicated that when a more robust 
acceptance criteria of 1,000 Ω insulation resistance was used, the EPR insulated cable 
failed at temperatures as low as 235 °C.  However, this data point should be used with 
caution.  As identified in their report, Jacobus and Fuehrer observed some cables were 
damage due to accelerated aging prior to the high temperature steam test.  Because their 
test procedure exposed cables to severe accelerated aging conditions that may not have 
adequately simulate the aging mechanism to represent actual plant conditions, it was 
unclear the actual state of the cables prior to high temperature steam testing.  Thus, 
damage from the accelerated aging may have caused the cables to perform worse than 
cables aged under normal plant conditions.  Therefore, the results from the NRC 
sponsored testing indicate that the current guidance for an EPR insulated cable were 
appropriate. 
The Kerite-FR cables tested for the NRC sponsored testing were manufactured in 
the 1970’s and stored at a utilities warehouse until donated for the test program.  The 
Kerite-FR cable samples used in the high temperature steam tests conducted by Jacobus 
and Fuehrer were also 1970’s vintage cable.  The NRC sponsored testing of Kerite-FR 
results identified the lowest Kerite-FR failure temperature at 249 °C, approximately 
81 °C below the current NRC generic thermoset threshold of 330 °C.  A closer evaluation 
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of the individual Kerite-FR trials indicated that of the eight trials, Kerite-FR cable 
product failed prior to the generic threshold seven times (approximately 87.5 %).  
However, this minimum failure temperature was approximately 96 °C above the results 
obtained by Jacobus and Fuehrer (153 °C) when the 1,000 Ω insulation resistance failure 
criteria was used.  Even with the concerns identified previously regarding the use of the 
accelerated aging test results, the NRC sponsored testing indicates that Kerite-FR 
insulated cables failed at temperatures below those typically identified with a thermoset 
material.  Although Kerite-FR cables were chemically a thermoset insulation material, 
the data obtained from the NRC sponsored testing did not support using the thermoset 
failure threshold of 330 °C for this cable insulation material.  The evidence presented 
here suggests that Kerite-FR should be treated as a thermoplastic, as suggested by the 
current NRC guidance.  
 NRC guidance did not provide insulation specific thermal failure thresholds for 
thermoplastic materials.  Following the NRC selection guidance, the NRC test data 
suggested the minimum failure temperatures presented in Table 6.  These results 
correlated well to the NRC generic thermoplastic threshold with the exception of PVC.  
The PVC cable samples experienced electrical functional failures prior to the generic 
thermoplastic 205 °C failure threshold.  The minimum temperature at failure for a PVC 
cable sample was 164 °C.  This indicated that the current NRC guidance for 
thermoplastic insulated cables may not bound all thermoplastic cable insulation 
formulations. 
The NRC sponsored testing results have shown that with a few exceptions, the 
current NRC guidance on fire-induced electrical cable failure thresholds were 
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appropriate.  Care should be used for specific insulations such as Kerite-FR and PVC 
when applying these generic threshold values.  When the generic failure thresholds for 
these two insulation materials were used, the estimated time to damage results were 
longer than the associated cables actual ability.  This would result in the analyst using a 
non-conservative non-suppression probability in the fire PRA.  Therefore, to be 
consistent with current NRC guidance, suggested minimum failure temperatures 
identified here be used in determining the time to cable damage.  In addition, the testing 
only evaluated a small variety of typical control cable insulation types and physical 
constructions found in NPPs.  Due to the proprietary nature of the polymer formulations 
used among cable manufacturers, the results presented here may not be bound all cable 
types.  Thus, the results presented here should only be used for control cables 
manufactured with the same insulation and jacket material type.  In addition, these results 
do not bound special cable designs, such as cables with armor or cables constructed with 
other unique components. 
5.2  Development of Cable Thermal Fragility Distributions 
 
 As an alternative approach to the minimum cable thermal failure thresholds for 
performance-based approaches, the NRC sponsored data were used to develop thermal 
fragility probability distributions.  These distributions could be used in Fire PRA to 
complement fire model cable damage predictions by assigning the probability of cable 
damage at specified thermal conditions.  For instance, the fire modeling efforts may 
develop a probability distribution for the temperature of a specific target cable.  This 
temperature profile could be combined with the cable thermal failure threshold 
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probability to result in a joint probability of cable damage (Pcd,i|j).  This approach is found 
in section 5.3.2. 
To develop thermal threshold probability distributions, a select set of data from 
the NRC tests was used.  First, any test where the cable ignited before electrical failure 
occurred was removed.  This was done so that uncertainties associated with temperature 
measurements were eliminated.  Under cable combustion conditions, the electrical 
cable’s jacket and insulation materials were being consumed.  During this process it was 
unknown if the thermocouple was measuring the actual sub-jacket temperature or some 
combination of air temperature and flame radiation due to the cable material degradation.  
The NRC intermediate-scale data was not used for similar reasons, specifically, there 
were no indications when the cables ignited and burned.  Therefore these distributions 
were developed using only the highly controlled, small-scale radiant “Penlight” tests 
where electrical failure occurred prior to cable ignition. 
The first task in developing these distributions was to plot the data for each cable 
insulation material using histograms.  The shape of these histograms indicated that the 
thermoplastic data may fit a log-normal distribution, while the thermoset data may fit to a 
normal or log-normal distribution.  The distribution parameters were estimated from the 
data and confirmed using Matlab R2011b.  The resulting distributions were plotted 
against the original data set represented by histograms to visually inspect the goodness of 
fit.  To quantitatively address the goodness of fit, K-S statistical tests were conducted 
using Matlab R2011b.  The K-S results indicated that the log-normal distribution fit the 
data better and the log-normal distribution was then used exclusively to define the 
distributions for all cable categories (TS, PVC, PE).  Figure 28 and 29 show the 
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developed distributions.  Distributions for Kerite-FR and TEF were not developed due to 
the limited amount of failure data.  Additionally, Kerite-FR data was not poolable with 
the TS data distribution and TEF data could not be pooled with either the PE or PVC data 
sets.  The bin size used to develop these histograms was 20 °C.   
 

























































Figure 29. Overlay of thermoset log-normal distribution on SNL thermoset data histogram 
 
 The thermoplastic distributions showed a possible bi-modal failure mechanism, 
especially for the PE data set.  The NRC sponsored data contained a group of PE 
insulated cable failure temperatures in the range of 200 – 270 °C and then another group 
of failure temperature between 310 – 475 °C.  A review of the parameters associated with 
each group was not able identify the cause of this phenomena.  One possibility of this 
result may have been a phenomena identified in the recent SNL testing to quantify the 
failure threshold of Kerite-FR cable.  During this testing, it was observed that there were 
two failure ranges.  At the lower failure range the cables would either fail or experience a 
small insulation resistance decreased followed by a recovery to pre-test IR values.  For 
those cables that didn’t fail at the lower temperatures, cable failure occurred at 
temperatures approximately 100 °C higher.  During these tests, it was observed that a 
Temperature (°C)



























p value = 0.8905
mean = 6.0704
st. dev. = 0.0872
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conductive fluid developed during heatup of the cable and in combination with localized 
insulation defects lower temperature failure was observed [Nowlen and Brown 2011].  
This could be one possible cause of the two failure ranges observed in the PE.  This 
phenomena may likely be attributed to the cable manufacturers proprietary blend of 
materials to manufacture cable insulation polymers.  As discussed in section 3.1, the 
amount of additives and plasticizers can have an effect on the performance of electrical 
cable during severe fire conditions.  Since the data set for the two thermoplastic insulated 
cable materials are a composite of cables manufactured from different cable 
manufacturers, the differences in insulation blends may be influencing the failure point 
and causing the bi-modal results.  To refine the understanding of the specific failure 
temperature, a utility or cable manufacturer could pursue testing specific cables to refine 
the thermal failure point and develop thermal fragility distributions based on their results.  
As a result of the thermoplastic data sets poor distribution fit, the desire to develop a 
bounding cable thermal fragility curve for PE and PVC, and the lack of understanding 
related to cause of the bi-modal phenomena, it was determined that removal of the group 
of data that failed at the higher temperature range would enhance the representation of the 
thermoplastic electrical failure temperatures.  Thus, the reduced thermoplastic data set 
was plotted in a histogram shown in Figure 30 with the associated distribution curve 
plotted on top of the histogram.  The various cable insulation specific thermal failure 
threshold probability distribution numerical results suggested for use in fire PRA 
applications are presented in Table 7.  A generic TP distribution was not developed due 




Figure 30. Overlay of PVC and PE log-normal distribution on SNL PVC and PE data histograms 
(with higher temperature data group removed) 
 
Table 7. Numerical Results for Cable Thermal Fragility Distributions (log-normal) and distribution 
parameters 
  Temperature (°C) 
Quantile, q z-value TS PE PVC 
0.02 -2.054 362 216 178 
0.05 -1.645 375 222 184 
0.10 -1.282 387 227 190 
0.15 -1.036 395 231 194 
0.20 -0.842 402 234 197 
0.25 -0.674 408 237 200 
0.30 -0.524 414 239 203 
0.35 -0.385 419 241 205 
0.40 -0.253 423 243 207 
0.45 -0.126 428 245 209 
0.50 0.000 433 247 212 
0.55 0.126 438 250 214 
0.60 0.253 443 252 216 
0.65 0.385 448 254 219 
0.70 0.524 453 256 221 
0.75 0.674 459 259 224 
0.80 0.842 466 262 227 
0.85 1.036 474 265 231 
0.90 1.282 484 269 236 
0.95 1.645 500 276 243 
0.98 2.054 518 284 251 
0.999 3.090 567 304 274 
Mean 6.0704 5.511 5.3551 
Standard Deviation 0.0872 0.0661 0.0836 
p value 0.8905 0.9892 0.9034 
 
Temperature (°C)















































p value = 0.9034
mean = 5.3551
st. dev. = 0.0836
p value = 0.9892
mean = 5.511
st. dev. = 0.0661
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The evaluation of the NRC sponsored data sub-jacket temperatures at electrical 
functional failure confirmed that cables fail not at a single point but over a distribution of 
temperatures.  In the TS class of cable insulation XLPE and EPR thermal performance 
was nearly identical with a mean failure temperature of 435 °C and 431 °C, respectively.  
However, XLPE cables experienced a minimum failure temperature of 335 °C while the 
minimum for the EPR cable was 364 °C, indicating that the XLPE fails at a lower 
temperature than EPR.  This conclusion confirmed the NRC and Murphy’s conclusion 
that XLPE insulated cables fail at lower temperatures than other thermoset insulation 
materials and should be used as a basis to select a generic thermoset threshold. 
The three thermoplastic cable insulation materials indicated that PVC insulated 
cables failed at the lowest temperatures with a mean failure temperature of 220 °C.  The 
NRC sponsored data from the PE and Tefzel insulation cables both show a mean failure 
temperature of 311 °C.  The minimum failure temperature of these two cables indicates 
that PE is less robust to thermal insult than the Tefzel cable insulation.  The data for the 
PE and PVC insulated cables show a larger standard deviation than that of the TS variety 
tested.  The origional PE and PVC distribution fits passed the K-S statistical test, 
however these distribution fits are not as strong as the TS distribution fit.  Following 
removal of the higher bi-modal data from the PVC and PE sets, the K-S tests showed a 
stronger agreement between the data and the developed distribution.  Even with the 
distributions adequate fitting the experimental data, it was determined to be valuable to 
evaluate the tails of the distribution to ensure that they represent actual failure points.  In 
other words, if a distribution’s lower bound showed cables failing at 100 °C and the 
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minimum failure temperature from data was 150 °C, then that distribution was not 
accurately modeling the failure temperatures of the cable insulation.   
For this evaluation, the 2nd quantile was used as it is typical for EPRI/NRC-RES 
fire PRA method to use the 98th percentile to quantify certain data sets, such as heat 
release rates [EPRI/NRC-RES 2005].  Here the 2nd quantile would correspond to the 98th 
percentile of the cable not experiencing damage.  The distribution numerical results 
presented in Table 7 and the NRC sponsored test data will be used to provide the 
comparison. 
For the TS distribution, the 2nd quantile corresponded to 362 °C.  The minimum 
failure temperature identified in the data for thermoset insulated cables (excluding Kerite-
FR) was 335 °C.  Here the TS distribution 2nd quantile is approximately 8.1 % above the 
lowest data point.  Therefore, the distribution was predicting failure temperatures that 
were realistic and representative of the NRC sponsored data set. 
The PVC distribution 2nd quantile corresponded to 178 °C and the NRC sponsored 
data failure temperature for PVC was identified as 163 °C.  Here the PVC distribution 2nd 
quantile was 9.2 % above the minimum observed failure temperature.  Since the data 
shows that cable failure can occur below the 2nd quantile value for the PVC distribution 
the lower limit of the distribution was determined to be acceptable. 
The PE distribution 2nd quantile was identified as 216 °C and the minimum failure 
temperature observed from the testing was 201 °C.  The PE distribution 2nd quantile was 
approximately 7.5 % above the minimum observed failure temperature.  Again, the 
testing has shown that cable failure can occur at temperatures lower than the 2nd quantile 
of the PE distribution and thus the PVC distribution lower limit was determined to be 
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acceptable.   The thermal fragility curves developed here are used in section 5.3.2 to 
evaluate the current methods to calculate the cable damage probability.  As discussed in 
the previous section 5.1, care should be taken when applying these thermal fragility 
curves.  Since they are developed from a specific set of control cable insulation and 
jacket material configurations, these distributions are only applicable to cables of similar 
design.  Use of these distributions with other cable configurations should be accompanied 
by an evaluation of the thermal failure temperature of the cable design for which the 
distribution is to be applied to.  Failure to ensure alternative cable type failure 
temperatures fit the selected distribution may invalidate the results. 
5.3 THIEF Model Predictions Based On Experimental Data 
 
 This section evaluates the FDTs THIEF model prediction capabilities using the 
NRC FDTs THIEF spreadsheet and the data from NRC sponsored tests.  A determination 
of the FDTs THIEF model bias and standard deviation based on the NRC data is also 
presented. 
 Data used in the evaluation of the FDTs THIEF model included Penlight data 
from the CAROLFIRE and DESIREE-FIRE along with the CAROLFIRE intermediate-
scale tests.  The CAROLFIRE intermediate-scale tests were included to provide some 
comparison between the model prediction capabilities of real live fire environments to the 
radiant penlight results.  The DESIREE-Fire intermediate-scale tests instrumented a 
limited number of special cable samples (Kerite-FR and Armored) for sub-jacket thermal 
response.  Due to these cables’ unique construction, the data from the intermediate-scale 
tests conducted in DESIREE-Fire were not used.  Other data removed from this 
evaluation included tests where the thermally monitored cable was of a different 
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insulation material type than the electrically monitored cable.  For example, the 
CAROLFIRE tests included cables in bundled pyramid configurations where a bundle of 
six cables (½ TS and ½ TP) monitored for electrical response and only one separate cable 
monitored for thermal response.  For these cases, only the data from the electrically 
monitored cables that were identical to the thermally monitored cable were used.  This 
was determined to be important because of the differences in the cable jacket thicknesses, 
diameters, and mass per unit lengths vary among cable products tested and would not 
allow for a direct comparison.  In addition, cables that experienced ignition prior to 
electrical functional failure are noted in the evaluation.  As will be shown, ignition prior 
to electrical functional failure has a significant effect on the ability of the THIEF model 
to accurately predict sub-jacket failure temperature. 
The FDTs THIEF model required several inputs, including a gas temperature 
profile, cable basic physical properties (diameter, mass per unit length, jacket thickness), 
raceway routing configuration, user specified failure temperature and a simulation time.  
The cable properties used for the evaluation conducted are presented in Table 8.  The 
cable configuration properties were taken directly from test reports [McGrattan 2008].  























1 PVC/PVC, 7/C thermoplastic 1.1 12.4 0.324 
2 EPR/CPE, 7/C thermoset 1.52 15.1 0.383 
3 XLPE/PVC, 7/C Mixed 1.52 15.1 0.372 
4 PVC/PVC, 2/C thermoplastic 1.0 7.0 0.076 
5 PVC/PVC, 3/C thermoplastic 1.52 15.2 0.440 
6 PVC/PVC, 12/C thermoplastic 1.1 11.3 0.195 
10 XLPE/CSPE, 7/C thermoset 1.52 15.0 0.393 
12 TEF/TEF, 7/C thermoplastic 0.5 10.2 0.292 
13 XLPE/CSPE, 12/C thermoset 1.1 12.7 0.231 
14 XLPE/CSPE, 3/C thermoset 1.52 16.3 0.508 




Mixed 1.27 24.4 0.981 
K1 Kerite-FR, 10/C thermoset 2.03 26.9 - 
K3 Kerite-HTK, 3/C thermoset 1.65 22.1 - 
K5 Kerite-FR, 9/C thermoset 1.65 21.6 - 
 
 
Figure 31. End view of cables evaluated in this thesis [Nowlen and Wyant 2008] 
 
The selection of the model’s raceway configuration (tray or conduit) matched the 
actual experimental configuration (i.e., if the experiment tested a cable in 63 mm rigid 
steel conduit, the THIEF FDTs model used a 63 mm rigid steel conduit).  The simulation 
time was set to the length of the actual experiment.  The user specified failure 
temperature was set to an arbitrary high temperature (1000 °C) to allow the simulation to 
run the duration specified by the simulation time.  Specifying a generic cable failure 
temperature (205 °C for thermoplastic or 330 °C for thermoset) in the FDTs THIEF 
spreadsheet would cause the model to stop calculating sub-jacket temperature when the 
predicted temperature exceeded the user specified failure temperature.  This was not 
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desired because the model temperature prediction was compared to the actual 
experimental sub-jacket temperature which routinely exceeded these generic thresholds. 
The shroud temperature was selected for the exposing gas temperature profile for 
the Penlight radiant tests.  The shroud temperature was used instead of the air 
thermocouple measurements for two reasons. First the locations of the thermocouples 
measuring the external air temperature were not located at the middle of the exposure 
chamber, but approximately 0.25 m from the middle cross-section of the shroud.  Due to 
the Penlight thermal exposure profile described in section 4.2.2.10, the air thermocouples 
would be recording a lower temperature than if they were located at the middle of the 
chamber where the most severe thermal exposure are located and the expected location 
for cable damage to occur.  Secondly, the poor ability of the air to conduct radiant heat 
indicated that the shroud temperature was a better representation of the exposing thermal 
profile to the cable.  The Penlight exposure profile was close to a step function, with a 
linear heat up from ambient to steady state conditions taking 1-2 minutes.  The shroud 
exposure temperatures ranged from 300-525 °C for the thermoplastic cables and between 
470-700 °C for the thermoset cables.  For the intermediate-scale tests, the exposing gas 
temperature profile near the electrically monitored cable was used in the FDTs THIEF 
simulations. 
With an exposing temperature profile for each test and a corresponding sub-jacket 
temperature profile, the FDTs THIEF model predictions were evaluated against the 
experimentally measured sub-jacket cable temperatures.  Tables 9 through 13 present the 
results of the FDTs THIEF model simulations.  These tables present the FDTs THIEF 
model sub-jacket temperature prediction at the time that the actual experimental circuit 
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electrical failure, the experimental sub-jacket temperature at time of electrical failure 
(typically two measurements), cable ignition status occurs prior to electrical functional 
failure, and the error between measured and predicted, calculated as; 
 
   100%. Equation 7 
Table 9. Comparison of THIEF model predictions versus CAROLFIRE penlight experimental 












PT-4 229.6 195.5 200.6 17.4 14.5 
No 
PT-5 253.2 212.9 211.0 18.9 20.0 
PT-6 255.6 215.8 206.1 18.4 24.0 
PT-8 198.2 163.8 173.8 21.0 14.0 
PT-10 279.9 227.5 N/A* 23.0 N/A 
PT-14 289.5 237.9 237.4 21.7 21.9 
PT-15 274.4 266.2 246.2 3.1 11.5 
PT-16 278.1 244.0 236.0 14.0 17.8 
PT-21 245.0 229.0 196.0 7.0 25.0 
PT-22 404.8 384.4 382.3 5.3 5.9 
PT-29 269.7 239.2 232.3 12.8 16.1 
PT-30 235.6 256.0 243.0 -8.0 -3.0 
PT-35 E 412.2 384.7 325.3 7.1 26.7 
PT-37 B 521.9 440.2 419.2 18.6 24.5 
PT-37 C 523.2 440.0 447.3 18.9 17.0 
PT-46 E 397.5 307.3 320.5 29.4 24.0 
PT-49 C 521.8 471.9 452.3 10.6 15.4 
PT-50 A 433.8 309.2 355.5 40.3 22.0 
PT-63 251.5 208.4 205.5 20.7 22.4 
PT-65 275.3 237.7 N/A 15.8 N/A 
PT-68 507.4 411.9 415.3 23.2 22.2 
PT-35 B 453.5 510.7 474.4 -11.2 -4.4 
Yes 
PT-35 C 442.5 470.8 444.3 -6.0 -0.4 
PT-43 B 279.4 176.5 229.7 58.3 21.6 
PT-43 C 396.8 491.4 575.6 -19.3 -31.1 
PT-43 E 455.0 698.6 698.6 -34.9 -34.9 
PT-44A 468.3 227.5 556.2 105.8 -15.8 
PT-44E 499.2 295.3 597.6 69.0 -16.5 
PT-45 A 507.0 5375 N/A -90.6 N/A 
PT-45E 475.1 556.3 N/A -14.6 N/A 
PT-46B 405.6 245.6 532.1 65.1 -23.8 




Table 10. Comparison of THIEF model predictions versus CAROLFIRE penlight experimental 










PT-1 436.9 395.8 393.5 10.4 11.0 
No 
PT-7 472.0 403.3 423.7 17.0 11.4 
PT-9 465.6 417.7 412.7 11.5 12.8 
PT-11 469.4 414.8 425.0 13.2 10.4 
PT-12 471.7 425.5 419.4 10.9 12.5 
PT-13 471.2 433.9 419.1 8.6 12.4 
PT-19 471.2 435.6 418.9 8.2 12.5 
PT-23 462.3 424.6 429.0 8.9 7.8 
PT-24 464.3 431.7 422.0 7.6 10.0 
PT-27 467.9 423.3 426.4 10.5 9.7 
PT-28 466.3 430.4 421.4 8.3 10.7 
PT-34 A 519.3 412.0 430.2 26.0 20.7 
PT-34 B 523.3 468.6 442.0 11.7 18.4 
PT-34 C 522.6 445.1 432.7 17.4 20.8 
PT-34 D 523.0 450.6 433.4 16.1 20.7 
PT-34 E 523.1 464.8 534.6 12.5 -2.2 
PT-34 F 523.1 501.1 454.4 4.4 15.1 
PT-36 A 517.1 463.6 455.7 11.5 13.5 
PT-36 B 512.2 439.3 459.8 16.6 11.4 
PT-36 C 508.7 457.6 430.6 11.2 18.1 
PT-37 A 525.1 436.8 445.8 20.2 17.8 
PT-45 C 513.1 521.1 511.4 -1.5 0.3 
PT-47 A 515.8 438.0 457.3 17.8 12.8 
PT-47 B 518.8 422.9 451.5 22.7 14.9 
PT-47 C 495.4 366.5 423.7 35.2 16.9 
PT-48 A 508.5 393.0 426.5 29.4 19.2 
PT-48 B 523.3 484.0 465.5 8.1 12.4 
PT-48 C 522.6 469.2 462.0 11.4 13.1 
PT-49 A 525.5 481.8 464.2 9.1 13.2 
PT-49 B 525.6 481.2 461.5 9.2 13.9 
PT-50 B 511.0 407.0 445.6 25.6 14.7 
PT-50 C 524.4 454.0 469.7 15.5 11.6 
PT-61 A 514.1 422.4 438.3 21.7 17.3 
PT-61 B 522.5 453.6 466.2 15.2 12.1 
PT-61 C 519.9 437.2 455.6 18.9 14.1 
PT-68 D 515.8 399.4 394.5 29.1 30.7 
PT-68 F 514.1 398.7 403.5 28.9 27.4 
PT-19* 370.8 426.0 441.3 -13.0 -16.0 
Yes 
PT-17 429.7 641.6 532.9 -33.0 -19.4 
PT-2 433.1 470.0 519.9 -7.9 -16.7 
PT-20 435.7 440.1 447.1 -1.0 -2.5 
PT-3 418.9 452.9 529.6 -7.5 -20.9 
PT-35 A 517.9 657.2 652.2 -21.2 -20.6 












PT-35 F 483.6 642.7 550.4 -24.8 -12.1 
Yes 
PT-43 A 478.9 680.5 697.1 -29.6 -31.3 
PT-43 D 460.2 640.8 676.7 -28.2 -32.0 
PT-43 F 477.3 619.5 652.2 -23.0 -26.8 
PT-44 C 478.9 227.5 556.2 110.5 -13.9 
PT-44 D 498.3 295.3 597.6 68.7 -16.6 
PT-45 B 515.8 537.5 N/A -4.0 N/A 
PT-46 D 504.5 552.5 572.4 -8.7 -11.9 
PT-46 F 432.7 382.8 613.3 13.0 -29.4 
PT-60 A 511.6 625.8 623.2 -18.2 -17.9 
PT-60 B 461.7 498.7 447.8 -7.4 3.1 
PT-60 C 497.6 674.4 574.1 -26.2 -13.3 
PT-60 D 488.0 602.7 548.2 -19.0 -11.0 
PT-60 E 555.0 562.2 547.0 -1.3 1.5 
PT-60 F 511.6 625.8 632.2 -18.2 -19.1 
PT-62  371.8 520.4 460.5 -28.6 -19.3 
PT-64 363.3 588.9 N/A -38.3 N/A 
PT-68 B 495.6 485.0 511.4 2.2 -3.1 
PT-68 C 471.3 399.4 394.5 18.0 19.5 




Table 11. Comparison of THIEF model predictions versus DESIREE-Fire penlight experimental 











P-23-SOV1 344.0 383.9 390.3 -10.4 -11.9 
No 
P-23-SOV2 353.0 416.9 417.0 -15.3 -15.3 
P-24-SwGr-T 469.0 364.5 374.7 28.7 25.2 
P-25-MOV1 407.0 488.1 426.7 -16.6 -4.6 
P-25-MOV2 386.0 380.5 377.7 1.4 2.2 
P-35-SwGr-T 516.3 404.6 N/A 27.6 N/A 
P-35-SwGr-C 516.3 404.6 N/A 27.6 N/A 
P-37-MOV1 517.7 424.9 N/A 21.8 N/A 
P-37-MOV2 518.2 426.9 N/A 21.4 N/A 
P-42-SwGr-T 453.9 398.7 410.83 13.8 10.5 
P-24-SwGr-C 470.0 539.9 643.7 -12.9 -27.0 
Yes 
P-1-SOV1 401.2 510.7 522.8 -21.4 -23.3 
P-1-SOV2 387.3 499.8 530.4 -22.5 -27.0 
P-2-SOV1 392.7 436.9 498.0 -10.1 -21.1 
P-2-SOV2 406.6 475.1 477.1 -14.4 -14.8 
P-3-SwGr-T 418.0 487.9 499.0 -14.3 -16.2 
P-5-LgCoil 415.1 432.0 459.8 -3.9 -9.7 
P-5-Valve 408.2 432.0 459.8 -5.5 -11.2 
P-6-LgCoil 416.0 470.2 499.8 -11.5 -16.8 
P-6-Valve 412.9 451.0 465.2 -8.4 -11.2 
P-7-MOV1 392.0 457.0 467.9 -14.2 -16.2 
P-7-MOV1 381.3 588.17 600.9 -35.2 -36.5 
P-8-MOV1 379.0 467.65 579.3 -19.0 -34.6 
P-8-MOV1 367.9 398.0 401.7 -7.6 -8.4 





Table 12. Comparison of THIEF model predictions versus DESIREE-FIRE penlight experimental 













P-9-SOV1 275 249.5 258.3 10.2 6.5 
No 
P-9-SOV2 271 246.1 250.4 10.1 8.2 
P-10-SwGr-T 279 253.5 264.6 10.1 5.4 
P-10-SwGr-C 281 254.3 281.0 10.5 0.0 
P-11-LgCoil 306 263.7 268.7 16.0 13.9 
P-11-Valve 307 265.3 269.7 15.7 13.8 
P-12-MOV1 275 236.2 238.5 16.4 15.3 
P-12-MOV2 308 255.0 256.0 20.8 20.3 
P-38-SOV1 428 459.3 N/A -6.8 N/A 
P-38-SOV2 340 258.9 N/A 31.3 N/A 
P-40-LgCoil 445 427.8 N/A 4.0 N/A 
P-40-Valve 446 432.3 N/A 3.2 N/A 
P-31-SOV1 222 203.0 216.0 9.4 2.8 
P-31-SOV2 229 207.0 219.0 10.6 4.6 
P-32-SwGr-T 270 222.0 225.0 21.6 20.0 
P-32-SwGr-C 271 223.1 225.3 21.5 20.3 
P-33-MOV1 266 223.1 224.4 19.2 18.5 
P-33-MOV2 264 223.2 222.9 18.3 18.4 
P-28-SOV1 348 291.7 295.4 19.3 17.8 
P-28-SOV2 365 300.0 303.0 21.7 20.5 
P-29-SwGr-T 393 302.7 306.2 29.8 28.3 
P-29-SwGr-C 396 310.4 311.6 27.6 27.1 
P-30-MOV1 343 293.0 289.0 17.1 18.7 
P-30-MOV2 344 292.9 290.0 17.4 18.6 
P-39-SwGr-T 375 347.6 N/A 7.9 N/A 
Yes 
P-39-SwGr-C 477 504.1 N/A -5.4 N/A 
P-41-MOV1 522 504.4 N/A 3.5 N/A 






Table 13. Comparison of THIEF model predictions versus CAROLFIRE intermediate-scale 















IT-10-CK4 373 388.5 400.1 -4.0 -6.8 
Unknown 
IT-11-CK3 151 224.0 N/A -32.6 N/A 
IT-12-CK3 179 67.2 71.0 166.4 152.1 
IT-2-CK3 154 234.0 N/A -34.2 N/A 
IT-3-CK4 196 82.9 118.4 136.4 65.5 
IT-7-CK1 165 190.4 N/A -13.3 N/A 
IT-9-CK4 217 290.5 N/A -25.3 N/A 
IT-11-CK2 191 89.1 115.8 114.4 64.9 
IT-12-CK2 210 161.5 190.7 30.0 10.1 
TS 
IT-1-CK1 378 291.1 N/A 29.9 N/A 
IT-1-CK2 375 283.3 N/A 32.4 N/A 
IT-1-CK3 345 221.6 N/A 55.7 N/A 
IT-1-CK4 370 269.5 N/A 37.3 N/A 
IT-6-CK3 740 828.0 824.3 -10.6 -10.2 
IT-13-CK1 590 551.2 516.5 7.0 14.2 
IT-14-CK1 562 536.9 428.3 4.7 31.2 
IT-14-CK2 556 520.2 351.1 6.9 58.4 
IT-10-CK1 250 219.8 232.4 13.7 7.6 
IT-13-CK3 455 392.1 470.2 16.0 -3.2 
IT-14-CK3 431 433.4 451.3 -0.6 -4.5 
IT-14-CK4 404 390.9 416.9 3.4 -3.1 
IT-9-CK1 396 335.9 422.2 17.9 -6.2 
 
 
 Figure 32 shows the results of the THIEF FDTs model predicted versus 
experimental measured temperature at the time of electrical cable functional failure for 
the CAROLFIRE small-scale radiant penlight tests.  Figure 33 shows the results from the 
DESIREE-Fire Penlight test data and Figure 34 for the CAROLFIRE intermediate-scale 
testing.  In all of these figures, a solid linear line with a slope of 1 has been inserted.  
Data points lying on this line represent a model prediction that is in agreement with the 
experimentally measured value.  In some of the plots a long dashed line and two dotted 
lines have been inserted.  The long dashed line represent the mean of the data and the 




Figure 32.  THIEF Temperature Prediction versus Measured Temperature at Time of 1st Electrical 
Failure for CAROLFIRE Penlight experiments showing effect of cable ignition.  Plot on left contains 
all data points, plot on right shows only data points where cable electrical failure occurs prior to 
cable ignition (long dashed line is mean of data with doted lines one standard deviation). 
 
 
Figure 33. THIEF Temperature Prediction versus Measured Temperature at Time of 1st Electrical 
Failure for DESIREE-Fire Penlight experiments showing effect of cable ignition.  Plot on left 
contains all data points, plot on right shows only data points where cable electrical failure occurs 
prior to cable ignition (long dashed line is mean of data with doted lines one standard deviation). 
 
 The left plot in Figures 32 and 33 contains all of the penlight small-scale test data 
for the respective test programs.  As shown the predicted and measured points agree until 
approximately 400 °C.  At this point and above, dispersion of the measured temperatures 
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occurs indicating that the model is under-predicting the sub-jacket temperature at 
electrical failure.  This was likely due to cable ignition, the FDTs THIEF’s inability to 
predict cable ignition and subsequent cable burning, and the use of the Penlight shroud 
temperature as the model exposing gas temperature input profile.  The maximum shroud 
temperatures used for the penlight tests was 525 °C.  This corresponded to the maximum 
model input exposing temperature.  As can be seen from the left plot in Figures 32 and 
33, no data lies above 525 °C on the vertical (predicted temperature) axis.  Since the 
model does not include cable combustion, the maximum predicted subjacket temperature 
cannot exceed the maximum input exposing temperature which was the Penlight shroud 
temperature.  Therefore, when the cable ignited it was exposed to higher temperature than 
the shroud exposure and the corresponding cable subjacket temperature was higher than 
the temperature calculated by the FDTs THIEF model.  The plot on the right represents 
the same data shown to the left, but with data points removed that correspond to electrical 
failure occurring after the cable ignites.  These results were nearly linear and indicate that 
when cable ignition was ignored, the model over-predicted the sub-jacket temperature by 
15.1 % on average with a standard deviation of 7.2 %.  As presented by McGrattan, the 
THIEF model does not include ignition and burning [McGrattan 2008].  For the Penlight 
DESIREE-FIRE data the model over-predicted the sub-jacket temperature by 13.0 % on 
average with a standard deviation of 11.9 %. 
 A similar approach can be taken for the CAROLFIRE intermediate-scale 
experiments.  However, due to the experimental setup, cables in location A (refer to 
Figure 17) are immersed in flames from the onset of the test and cable ignition cannot be 
determined from the test data.  So these data points have been removed entirely from the 
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evaluation.  Figure 34 shows the results of this evaluation.  On average, THIEF over-
predicted the sub-jacket temperature by 22.0 %, with a standard deviation of 38.3 % for 
the CAROLFIRE intermediate-scale tests. 
 
Figure 34.  FDTs THIEF Temperature prediction versus measured temperature at time of 1st failure 
for CAROLFIRE Intermediate-scale experiments with data parsed by insulation type. 
 
 This review of FDTs THIEF temperature predictions based on experimental data 
has shown the model to over-predict the electrical cables sub-jacket temperatures based 
on a predefined cable failure time.  The failure times used here were when the cable in 
each test experienced an electrical functional failure.  The model’s over-prediction of 
sub-jacket temperature corresponds to under-predicting the time to cable electrical 
damage because the FDTs THIEF model uses a user defined failure temperature to predict 
time of damage.  McGrattan has shown similar results when evaluating the THIEF model 
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predictive versus measured time to electrical cable sub-jacket temperature [McGrattan 
2008].  This is slightly conservative, a desirable property for use in fire PRA applications.  
As a result of under-predicting the time to damage estimates, the fire PRA would over-
predict the non-suppression probability to the fire scenario, which adds conservatism to 
the fire PRA. 
The next section will quantify this models over-prediction based on the NRC 
sponsored experimental data.  Once the model prediction capabilities are quantified, the 
model temperature prediction distributions will be combined with the cable thermal 
fragility distributions to develop joint probability of cable failure distributions that could 
find application in Fire PRA. 
5.3.1 Determination of THIEF model bias and standard deviation 
 
The NFPA performance-based standard for fire protection states that “only fire 
models that are acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction (i.e., NRC) shall be used in 
fire modeling calculations.”  In addition, acceptable fire models shall only be used within 
their limitations and shall be verified and validated (V&V) [NFPA 2001].  The NRC and 
EPRI performed a V&V study on five selected fire models, documented in NUREG-
1824.  The results of this study provided model statistics to understand the uncertainty of 
the model predictions.  These statistics are developed here for the FDTs THIEF model 
using the available information for the NRC CAROLFIRE and DESIREE-FIRE test data. 
 The NRC and EPRI presented methods to derive a fire model’s uncertainty 
statistics referred to as the bias factor, δ, that indicates the extent to which the model, on 
average, under- or over-predicted the measurement of a given quantity [EPRI/NRC-RES 
2007, EPRI/NRC-RES 2011].  A bias factor greater than 1.0 indicated that model over-
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predicted, while a bias factor less than 1.0 indicated under-prediction.  The second 
statistic was the relative standard deviation of the model, , and of the experiment, ,  
For a model prediction, M, these statistics and the assumption that the “true” value of the 
predicted quantity (temperature from THIEF) was a normally distributed random variable 
with a mean / , and a standard deviation /  [EPRI/NRC-RES 2011]. 
 NUREG-1934 presents the derivation of model uncertainty statistics as follows 
[EPRI/NRC-RES 2011]. 
 exp ln /  Equation 8 
 ∑ ln / ln /  Equation 9 
 ln / ∑ ln /  Equation 10 
where M is the model prediction and E is the experimental measurement. 
Using the experimental temperature measurements recorded at the time of circuit 
failure and the FDTs THIEF model predictions (presented in section 5.3), the bias factor 
and model standard deviation were calculated using Equations 8 through 10.  Data from 
CAROLFIRE and DESIREE-Fire Penlight tests, along with the CAROLFIRE 
intermediate-scale tests where electrical functional failures occurred prior to cable 
ignition were used.  The results are: 
 δTHIEF = 1.15 
 = 0.14 
 Therefore, the over-prediction of the FDTs THIEF model is found to be 15 % on 
average with a 14 % standard deviation.  For an experimental standard deviation,  , the 
error associated with the Type K thermocouple measurement was used (0.75 %) 
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[OMEGA 2012].  Increasing the experimental standard deviation by one order of 
magnitude (7.5%) and re-calculating the model bias and standard deviation remained 
1.15 for the bias factor and the standard deviation remained 0.14.  Therefore the bias and 
standard deviation are insensitive to the value used for experimental uncertainty. 
 The FDTs THEIF bias factor, δ, corresponded well to the mean error calculated 
for each data set in section 5.3 of 15.1 %, 22.0 %, and 13.0 % for the CAROLFIRE 
Penlight, intermediate-scale, and DESIREE-Fire Penlight respectively. 
The THIEF model predicted cable damage by simply calculating the heat 
conducted through the cable jacket in one dimension, ignoring the complex geometry of 
the components enclosed within the cable jacket (modeled as lumped parameter) and 
using experimental cable sub-jacket failure temperatures to correlate cable failure.  
Although this approach was simplistic, the incorporation of the THIEF target model into 
fire models such as FDS, CFAST, and FDTs has allowed for the time dependant thermal 
exposure conditions calculated by these fire models to be used to calculate the sub-jacket 
cable temperature.  The complex cable routing configurations found in NPPs, the 
uncertainty of a cables location within a cable raceway, and the results of the THIEF 
model evaluation presented in this section, has shown that the THIEF model provides an 
adequate method of calculating cable damage that can be used in the field.  However, the 
results of this model are dependent on the input parameters, and as such, the user must 
ensure that the cable properties (mass per unit length, cable diameter, jacket thickness), 
thermal exposure conditions, and sub-jacket cable failure temperature are known for the 
specific cable under evaluation and the associated fire scenario.  Uncertainties associated 
with any of these model inputs should be accounted for in the evaluation. 
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The development of a two dimensional cable heat conduction model could 
provide improvements to the THIEF model, however there are numerous challenges to 
such a models development (proprietary cable material properties, accounting for 
numerous cable routing configurations, etc.) and any benefit from developing such a 
model for use in fire PRA applications may not outweigh the costs associated with its 
development.  The area where greatest improvement to the THIEF model would be to 
develop a cable ignition model.  As was shown in the previous section, one weakness of 
the THIEF model was a lack of modeling cable ignition and the subsequent thermal 
exposures associated with cable combustion.  Rather than modifying the THIEF model to 
account for the ignition characteristics, it would be recommended to develop an cable 
ignition model.  Then the prediction of the time to cable failure would be whatever model 
predicted cable failure first (electrical failure via THIEF or ignition).  The data suggested 
that the tested cables failed shortly after ignition, therefore assuming cable damage at 
ignition seems reasonable. 
5.3.2 Evaluation of the cable damage thermal fragility distributions using 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
 With the FDTs THIEF prediction modeled as a normally distributed probability of 
the sub-jacket temperature and the cable thermal fragility probability distributions 
developed in section 5.2, these two distributions were combined to develop a joint cable 
damage probability based on the cable insulation material and the FDTs THIEF model 
prediction.  These results were then compared to the current method of calculating the 
probability of a sub-jacket cable temperature exceeding a single value threshold.   
Theoretically, a convolution of the two distributions could be computed, however the 
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analytical solution of this problem is complex and not always solvable.  Therefore, it was 
chosen to use a Monte Carlo (MC) simulation instead. 
 MC simulation relies on random sampling of distributions to compute a 
mathematical result.  For the scenarios conducted here, the MC simulation selects one 
random sample from the normally distributed “THIEF model predication” distribution 
and another independent random sample from the log-normal distributed cable thermal 
fragility distribution.  These two samples constitute one trial.  For each trial, if the FDTs 
THIEF fire model prediction value exceeded the cable thermal fragility value, the result 
would be cable damage and assigned an value of 1.  Conversely, if the fire model 
prediction value did not exceed the cable damage fragility sample, the cable would not be 
damage and this result was assigned a value of 0.  Each simulation consisted of 1,000 
trials and the result (1 or 0) of all 1,000 trials were averaged to develop the simulation 
probability of cable damage.  Next, one thousand simulations were run for each FDTs 
THIEF temperature prediction value and the mean of  probabilities from these 1,000 
simulations were recorded.  The choice of using 1,000 simulations was based on the 
convergence of the results based on simulations run at 100, 1,000, and 3,300 repetitions.  
Next the FDTs THIEF model prediction would be increased by 10 to 20 °C and the 
complete MC simulation would be repeated.  This was continued until the fire model 
prediction distribution transverse the cable thermal fragility distribution.  This was done 
for the three cable thermal fragility distributions developed in section 5.2, namely, 
thermoset insulated, PE insulated, and PVC insulated.  These MC simulations were run 
using Microsoft Excel™ and a Visual Basic Macro documented in Appendix A.  These 
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MC simulation results were then compared to the current method of calculating the cable 
damage probability, which is explained next. 
 Draft NUREG-1934 presented the current method for calculating the cable 
damage probability.  This method used the THIEF fire model prediction distributions to 
identify what the probability of exceeding a specific single point failure threshold (205 °C 
for thermoplastic and 330 °C for thermoset insulated cables).  The probability calculation 
are presented in Equation 11 based on a normal distribution, with an illustration shown in 
Figure 35. 
 √  Equation 11 
where, √  Equation 12 
 
Figure 35. Normal distribution of true value of cable temperature showing probability of model 
prediction exceeding cable damage temperature threshold of 330°C 
 
The results of the MC simulation (shown as blue circles) and the single threshold 
method used in NUREG-1934 (shown as red line) are presented in graphical and tabular 
forms.  Figure 36 and Table 14 present the results for the thermoset case, Figure 37 and 
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Table 15 contain the PE insulated cable case results, and Figure 38 and Table 16 for the 
PVC insulated case. 
It should be emphasized that these results were based on a limited variety of cable 
insulation materials (TS {XLPE, EPR} and PVC, PE).  The applicability of these results 
to cables other than those used to develop these probabilities was uncertain.  The same 
general method could be applied, however confirmation of the specific cable thermal 
failure point would need to be determined and compared to the results presented here.  
Lack of variability of experimental thermal exposure conditions also adds to the 
uncertainty of using these results generically. 
 
Figure 36. Probability of thermoset cable failure based on THIEF model prediction. 
 























200 1.24 x10-12 0 460 0.912 0.212 
240 4.67 x10-6 0 480 0.946 0.306 
260 2.63 x10-4 0 500 0.967 0.409 
280 4.01 x10-3 2.00x10-6 520 0.980 0.511 
300 0.025 1.80x10-5 540 0.988 0.606 
320 0.089 1.44x10-4 560 0.992 0.690 
THIEF Predicted Temperature (°C)

























TS MC CDF 
TS 1934 CDF 
THIEF Predicted Temperature (°C)
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340 0.208 9.38x10-4 600 0.997 0.819 
350 0.283 2.01x10-3 620 0.998 0.865 
360 0.364 4.01x10-3 640 0.999 0.900 
370 0.447 4.70x10-3 660 0.999 0.927 
380 0.528 1.34x10-2 680 0.999 0.947 
390 0.603 2.21x10-2 700 0.999 0.961 
400 0.671 3.40x10-2 720 0.999 0.972 
420 0.781 7.26x10-2 740 0.999 0.980 
440 0.860 0.1324 760 0.9999 0.985 
 
 
Figure 37. Probability of PE insulated cable failure based on THIEF model predication. 
 























140 1.69x10-8 0 340 0.9917 0.7634 
160 1.03x10-4 0 350 0.9944 0.8152 
170 1.404x10-3 0 370 0.9975 0.8910 
180 9.26x10-3 0 390 0.9988 0.9378 
190 3.62x10-2 0 410 0.9994 0.9650 
200 9.69x10-2 0.0003 430 0.9997 0.9803 
210 0.1962 0.0015 450 0.9998 0.9890 
220 0.3244 0.0055 470 0.9999 0.9939 
230 0.4627 0.0148 490 1.0 0.9965 
240 0.5930 0.0349 510 1.0 0.9979 
250 0.7039 0.0685 530 1.0 0.9989 
260 0.7913 0.1193 550 1.0 0.9993 
270 0.8564 0.1886 570 1.0 0.9996 
THIEF Predicted Temperature (°C)

























PE MC CDF 
PE 1934 CDF 
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280 0.9029 0.2696 590 1.0 0.9997 
290 0.9351 0.3599 610 1.0 0.9998 
300 0.9569 0.4531 630 1.0 0.9999 
310 0.9715 0.5433 650 1.0 0.9999 
320 0.9811 0.6270 670 1.0 1.0 
330 0.9875 0.7007 690 1.0 1.0 
 
 
Figure 38. Probability of PVC insulated cable failure based on THIEF model predication 
 























100 0 0 310 0.9715 0.8432 
120 3.88x10-16 0 320 0.9811 0.8830 
140 1.69x10-8 0 330 0.9875 0.9139 
160 1.02x10-4 0.0001 340 0.9917 0.9371 
170 1.40x10-3 0.0004 350 0.9944 0.9544 
180 9.26x10-3 0.0021 360 0.9962 0.9671 
190 3.62x10-2 0.0077 380 0.9983 0.9830 
200 9.69x10-2 0.0221 400 0.9992 0.9912 
210 0.1962 0.0512 420 0.9996 0.9954 
220 0.3244 0.0997 440 0.9998 0.9975 
230 0.4627 0.1689 460 0.9999 0.9987 
240 0.5930 0.2574 480 0.9999 0.9993 
250 0.7039 0.3564 500 1.0 0.9996 
260 0.7913 0.4581 520 1.0 0.9998 
270 0.8564 0.5580 540 1.0 0.9999 
280 0.9029 0.6490 560 1.0 0.9999 
THIEF Predicted Temperature (°C)

























PVC MC CDF 
PVC 1934 CDF 
THIEF Predicted Temperature (°C)
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290 0.9351 0.7271 580 1.0 1.0 
300 0.9569 0.7908 600 1.0 1.0 
 
The results indicated that the joint probability of cable damage using the cable 
fragility curves occur at higher temperatures than joint probability of cable damage using 
the single point failure threshold method.  To evaluate the amount of difference between 
these two probabilities, a relative difference evaluation between the two distribution for 
each insulation types was conducted.  To accomplish this evaluation, a MC simulation 
was conducted sampling from each joint distributions and a random variable was 
assigned the difference between the two sample temperatures (D = MC cable fragility 
distribution sample – single point distribution sample). Again, a MC simulation of one 
thousand simulations of one thousand trials were used.  The results are presented in 
histogram form in Figure 39 for the TS and Figure 40 for PE and PVC. 
 
Figure 39. Histogram of relative difference simulation results for TS distributions 
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Figure 40. Histogram of relative difference simulation results for PE and PVC distributions 
 
This relative difference evaluation indicated that the TS distributions differed by 
145.5 °C, the PE distributions by 73.1 °C, and the PVC distributions by 32.2 °C.  The 
smaller relative difference between the PVC distributions can be attributed to several of 
the PVC insulated cable test failures occurring prior to the generic 205 °C thermoplastic 
threshold.  Therefore, this evaluation has identified that the current methods used to 
quantify the likelihood of cable damage to be larger than if thermal fragility distributions 
based on empirical data were used. 
5.4 Evaluation of fire-induced cable failure circuit response 
characteristics 
 
 This section evaluates the NRC sponsored test data for characteristics that 
influence electrical cable failure modes (section 5.3.1) and evaluates the ungrounded dc 
test data for equipment spurious operation occurring as a result of multiple conductor 
shorts to ground (section 5.3.2). 
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5.4.1 Evaluation of cable and circuit configuration effect on failure mode 
likelihood estimates 
 
The availability of the NRC test data allowed for an opportunity to compare these 
results with the previous EPRI/NEI results on the likelihood of a circuit experiencing 
fire-induced equipment spurious operation given cable damage.  The database discussed 
in section 5 allowed for a systematic evaluation for the effects that circuit/cable 
configuration variables may have on influencing the likelihood of a circuit experiencing a 
spurious operation. 
A graphical exploratory data analytical approach was taken to look at the effects 
various circuit configurations have on the likelihood of experiencing a fire-induced 
spurious operation.  Circuit configurations such as fuse size, thermal exposure conditions, 
circuit type, cable insulation type, raceway type, conductor size, and circuit grounding 
were used as categories to evaluate their effect (if any) on the likelihood of a test 
experiencing at least one fire-induced spurious operation.   
The evaluation looked at the test results in a binary fashion.  If a circuit 
experienced one or more fire-induced spurious operations the likelihood for that circuit 
was set to “1.”  If a circuit did not experience any fire-induced spurious operations, the 
likelihood for that circuit was set to “0.”  The data was then sorted by various circuit 
configurations and the likelihood numbers (1 or 0) were summed for the specific 
configuration and divided by the total number of circuits in the specific configuration.  
Using insulation material type (TS, TP) as an example. There were 148 circuit tests using 
a thermoset insulated cable.  Of these 148 circuits, 82 circuits experienced at least one 
fire-induced spurious operation.  Therefore the likelihood would be 82/148 or 0.554 for a 
thermoset insulated cable to experience a spurious operation.  The results from this 
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evaluation are shown in Figure 41, with the ac results shown in black and dc results in 
grey. 
 
Figure 41. Fire-induced spurious operation likelihood bar chart by circuit configuration. 
 These results indicated that the probability of a circuit experiencing a hot short 
induced intra-cable spurious operation were between 0.41 and 0.67, given a cable 
damaged from fire.  Comparing these results to the conditional probabilities found in the 
EPRI/NRC-RES fire PRA methodology shows similarities, with a few exceptions.  First, 
the fire PRA methodology presents a best estimate probability of 0.30 when the circuit 
was powered from a CPT and 0.60 when no CPT was used.  Figure 41 shows a 
probability of 0.62 when the CPT was used and 0.67 when no CPT was present.  
Likelihood of Spurious Operation Given Cable Damage 
(#occurances / # trials)

































Therefore, the new data indicated that the use of a CPT had little effect on reducing the 
probability of a circuit experiencing a spurious operation.  A review of the EPRI/NEI 
testing showed that the basis for the CPT credit was based on only 5 of the 16 tests which 
used CPTs to power the circuit.   
Secondly, the EPRI/NRC-RES method tables showed that the likelihood of an 
intra-cable spurious operation for a cable in a conduit to be ¼ of the likelihood for cables 
located in cable trays.  The evaluation of the NRC sponsored test data showed that cables 
located in conduits have a 0.59 likelihood of experiencing a spurious operation when 
damaged by fire, which is slightly larger than that of the cable tray at 0.53.   Therefore, 
the evaluation of the NRC sponsored test data showed that the probability credit for CPTs 
and cable trays in conduit does not appear to support the current methods identified the 
EPRI/NRC-RES fire PRA methodology.   
5.5 Evaluation of ungrounded systems spurious operations caused by 
multiple shorts to ground. 
 
The SNL test report did not identify any inter-cable spurious operation failures, 
nor was a review of the data conducted to specifically look for this failure mode [Nowlen, 
Brown, Olivier, Wyant 2012].  This section will evaluate the NRC sponsored DESIREE-
Fire test data to show that a failure mode not before identified has occurred.  This specific 
failure modes occurs when multiple conductors from different cables short to ground and 
cause spurious operations.  For this to occur, both cables must be associated with the 




5.5.1  Description of the multiple short to ground failure mode 
 
Inter-cable short circuit failures typically involve electrical conductors coming in 
physical contact with each other as a result of cable insulation degradation from fire 
damage.  However, in their failure mode and likelihood analysis, LaChance-Nowlen-
Wyant-Dandini identified the following, 
“Ungrounded circuits introduce a potential unique concern related to 
multiple shorts to ground.  If, for example, one phase of the power supply 
circuit shorts to ground, this would ‘float up’ the ground potential to the 
voltage of the shorted conductor.  A subsequent short to ground involving 
another conductor could then energize that second conductor.  In effect, 
multiple shorts to ground can mimic a hot short [LaChance, Nowlen, 
Wyant, Dandini 2003].” 
 
Therefore, when a common ungrounded power source, such as an ungrounded dc 
battery supply, is associated with cables that are degrading from severe thermal 
conditions any conductive electrical pathway can aid the inter-cable failure mode.  
A result of the lack of power supply isolation increases the number of potential cables, 
which if associated with the common power supply, could short to a common conductive 
plane and cause inter-cable hot shorts. 
A very common and available electrical pathway in NPPs is electrical ground, 
which can include conductors intentionally grounded or electrical cable raceways, which 
are grounded per code requirements [NFPA 2007].  Fire experimentation shows that 
shorts to ground are a likely failure mode and most cables will eventually short to ground 
given time and sufficient thermal exposure [Wyant and Nowlen 2002].  Figure 42 






Figure 42. Illustration of fire-induced ground fault equivalent hot short between cables in same 
grounded cable tray 
 
5.5.2 Approach used to identify Ground Fault Equivalent Spurious Operation 
 
Each NRC sponsored DESIREE-Fire intermediate-scale test used seven circuits 
(eight energized cables) along with another energized circuit used to independently 
evaluate inter-cable testing configuration.  This created 36 combinations of cable to cable 
interactions via the ground plane.  This larger number of circuits complicated the 
evaluation of the inter-cable shorting events.   
To identify inter-cable spurious operations, a simple yet beneficial approach was 
developed.  For an individual circuit (MOV-1, SOV-2, large coil, etc.) the current within 
that circuit was summed such that currents supplied from the positive battery terminal 
were added and currents returning to the negative battery terminal were subtracted.  





Figure 43.  dc MOV schematic showing current summation used in identifying inter- cable shorting 
behavior 
 
 isum_dcMOV = iP + iG + iR - ( iYC1 + iYO1 + iN )  Equation 13 
 
Under normal conditions, the current within a circuit sums to zero (Kirchhoff’s 
current law) [Del Toro 1972].  Under intra-cable only circuit failures, this law also holds 
such that the current within the circuit/cable remains in the cable and the sum is equal to 
zero.  However, when inter-cable interactions occur, current from one circuit is leaving 
the electrical circuit and entering another; thus for the inter-cable case the individual 
circuit currents do not sum to zero and there is a net current.  This net current is negative 
if the circuit if receiving current from some other circuit and positive if the circuit is 
supplying current to some other circuit. 
This method provides an efficient tool to quickly identify circuits involved in inter-
cable shorting.  However there are a few drawbacks: 
• First, this method only shows which circuits were involved and not what 
conductors.  To determine the conductors involved in the short circuit, the data 




• Next in the intermediate-scale testing, the inter-cable circuit configuration was 
included to attempt to observe proper polarity hot shorts, but this configuration 
was not instrumented for current measurement.  Thus, in some cases the current 
source could not be identified.  Therefore it can only be assumed that the source 
current was being supplied from the inter-cable circuit when no other source 
circuit was identified. 
• Next, there were a few circuits (small SOV’s in particular) which had a very low 
operating current (0.042 A).  Although they were typically discernable in the 
evaluation, they were not as apparent as the other circuit inter-cable shorts. 
• Next there may be cases where a circuit is losing and gaining current from other 
circuits simultaneously, these interactions could cancel one another and lead to 
difficulties in identifying the inter-cable short. 
• Lastly, there were several cases where a single circuit shorted abruptly to the 
common ground plane and caused several circuit protective devices to clear 
simultaneously without direct indication of which circuit initiated the event.  It is 
assumed that because of multiple fuse clears at the same time that there was a 
very abrupt current spike followed by fuse clear, which the data acquisition 
system (DAQ) was unable to capture. 
Once the current summation was completed for each test, the summed current profiles 
were plotted to identify inter-cable shorting.  Figure 44 shows a typical summation plot. 
This plot shows an instance during intermediate-scale test #3 where the 1-inch valve 
circuit operates spuriously via inter-cable short from the medium voltage switchgear 




Figure 44. Current summation plot for Intermediate-Scale Test #3 showing spurious operation of 1-
inch valve circuit being powered from switchgear circuit 
 
Once the circuits involved were identified, the circuit conductor data was reviewed to 
identify the conductors within the circuits involved in the inter-cable short.  This provides 
information on which conductor(s) acted as a source (provided the power) to energize the 
target conductors to cause spurious operation.  The identification of the conductors 
involved in the spurious operation has proven that an inter-cable hot short occurred, but 
does not confirm that multiple shorts to ground were the failure mechanism that caused 
this short.  To confirm this, one or two additional step(s) are required. 
First, the physical location of the cable associated with the circuits involved was 
reviewed.  If the target cable experiencing the spurious operation was located in a 
different cable raceway than the source cable supplying the power for the spurious 
operation, then it can be concluded that the only possibility for the inter-cable short was 
through the ground plane.  An example of this is shown in Figure 45.  In this figure, fire 
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damage has caused a conductor in a cable located in a cable tray to short to the cable tray 
rung, which is grounded per code requirements [NFPA 2007].  Another cable in a rigid 
steel conduit (different raceway) experiences a conductor short to the rigid steel conduit 
(also grounded).  Assuming that the conductors which short to the raceways are 
associated with a common ungrounded power supply, the two conductors are now at the 
same electrical potential.  A spurious operation would occur if one conductor were an 
energized source and the other was connected to a target to cause a spurious operation 
(motor starter contactor, solenoid operated valve, breaker trip coil, etc.).  In this example, 
since the cables were located in different cable raceways, the only possibility of an inter-
cable hot short is via ground plane interaction, indicating that this was an ground fault 
equivalent hot short. 
 
Figure 45. Illustration of ground fault equivalent hot short between different raceway.  Cable tray 
and conduit do not necessarily have to be in the same location, but must be connected to the same 
ground potential and be damaged from the same fire. 
 
If the source and target cables were located in the same cable raceway, the possibility 
exists for inter-cable spurious operation as a result of a cable-to-cable short that does not 
involve the ground plane (i.e., cable conductors of different cables physically touch due 
to fire damage).  To identify if the ground plane was involved for these cases, the ground 
fault detection circuit voltage transducer signals were evaluated.  A review of these 
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voltage profiles determined if the ground plane short to either battery potential occurred 
and aided in the ground fault equivalent spurious operation.   
Figure 46 presents the ground fault detection circuit voltage signals for 
intermediate-scale test #3, along with the current summation profiles for the 1-inch valve 
and the large coil (as was shown in Figure 41).  The voltage signals show the battery 
positive potential (shown as dashed black line “VTU_2”) electrically floats to the ground 
potential during the spurious operation (shown as solid maroon line).  The ground plane 
interaction with the battery voltage potential at the time of spurious operation, indicates 
that the ground plane was involved and the failure mode was not a cable-to-cable short 
independent of the ground plane. 
 
Figure 46.  Ground fault detection circuit profile showing (battery positive/negative short to ground) 
5.5.3  DESIREE-Fire Inter-cable Multiple Short to Ground Results 
 
All of the intermediate-scale tests were evaluated using the procedure outlined 
previously to identify circuits involved in multiple short to ground spurious operations.  
The results of these evaluations are shown in Table 17, with the voltage and current plots 
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used to identify spurious operations that were a result of inter-cable (cable-to-cable) 
shorting through the ground plane presented in Appendix A. 
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 A review of the DESIREE-Fire testing results specifically evaluating spurious 
operations caused by more than one cable shorting to ground has been shown to occur.  
The information in Table 17 indicates several parameters that influence the likelihood of 
experiencing these faults.  First is the timing issue.  The cables involved need to be 
damaged within the same time frame and have at least one fuse operable to participate in 
this type of short.  This timing issue results in the likelihood of cables of the same design 
(number of conductors, insulation materials, etc.) and located in the same raceway to be 
more likely to experience these types of failure.  In all but two cases, the same insulation 
materials were involved in the multiple shorts to ground.  The two cases where a 
thermoset and thermoplastic experienced multiple shorts to ground occurred due to the 
thermal exposure differences caused by the experimental setup.  This shows the 
importance fire exposure and raceway loading has in determining concurrent shorts to 
ground.  The duration of these multiple short to ground spurious operations in the test 








 This thesis has presented a thorough review of the most recent cable functionality 
testing under severe fire conditions.  The following conclusions can be made based on 
this review. 
1. The thermal failure temperature data sets for the ac CAROLFIRE and dc 
DESIREE-Fire tests can be merged by insulation material.  Based on 
evaluation of data points where electrical failure occurred prior to cable 
ignition, statistical evaluation has shown that the thermal failure temperatures 
were not influenced by circuit power source (ac or dc). 
2. Thermoset insulated cables that were tested (with the exception of Kerite-FR) 
performed at or above the generic failure threshold (330 °C).  The 
performance of thermoplastic insulated cables varied.  PVC was the worst 
performer with a minimum failure temperature of 163.8 °C or approximately 
41.2 °C below the generic threshold (205 °C).  One of 48 PE insulated cable 
samples failed at 202 °C, just below the generic 205 °C thermoplastic generic 
threshold.  All of the Tefzel insulated conductors failed above the generic 
threshold, with the lowest failure point occurring at 289 °C. 
3. Development of insulation material specific cable fragility distributions could 
aid in adding realism to the fire PRA.  However, the massive variety and 
proprietary formulations of electrical cable insulation results in the 
applicability of generic distributions being questionable with respect to the 
uncertainty that should be assigned.  Use of the fragility distributions 
developed here should be used with caution. 
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4. The FDTs THIEF model prediction capabilities have been shown to be a 
valuable tool for evaluating cable damage, provided that cable ignition does 
not occur.  Cable ignition will cause the cable to fail sooner than that 
predicted by FDTs THIEF model.  Therefore actual fire conditions may cuase 
a cable to fail prior to the model prediction, resulting in a non-conservative 
fire PRA estimate. 
5. The likelihood of a fire-induced damaged cable experiencing a spurious 
operation was evaluated.  The evaluation did not support the current 
likelihood prediction tables presented in the EPRI/NRC-RES fire PRA 
methodology for the use of control power transformers nor did it support the 
reduction in likelihood for cables located in rigid steel conduit raceway.  The 
evaluation conducted here suggests that the conditional probability of a circuit 
experiencing a spurious operation given cable damage is 0.60 when control 
power transformers are used and 0.67 with no control power transformer.  
Likewise, the NRC sponsored test data has shown that the cables in rigid steel 
conduit have a higher likelihood of experiencing a spurious operation at 0.59 
versus current guidance of 0.15 for thermoplastic and 0.075 for thermoset 
insulated cables. 
6. The DESIREE-FIRE data has provided the first source of data that has been 
used in this thesis to show that fire-induced cable damage can result in 
multiple cables shorting to ground in a configuration that will support short 
circuits through the cable raceway to cause equipment to spuriously operate.  
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For this to occur, the affected cables must be powered from a common power 
supply and be ungrounded. 
As a final note, one limitation to the conclusions presented here were based on 
severe fire conditions damaging the electrical cables.  The applicability of the result to 




7 Future Research 
 
 This thesis has identified several areas where additional research will help to 
advance the current state-of-the-art methods, they are; 
 
1. A performance based standard should be developed which exposes electrical 
cables to severe thermal exposures and identifies the sub-jacket temperature and 
time of failure using electrical failure criteria representative of functional failure 
for equipment found in a typical NPP.  This would allow for a consistent method 
to evaluate cable damage and possibly the development of a data base which 
could be used to further advance the fire PRA methods by understanding the 
variability of cable insulation materials to thermal damage. 
2. The THIEF model should be complemented with a cable ignition submodel.  A 
submodel should take into consideration the various geometric cable 
configurations found in NPPs.  This submodel should allow for identification of 
cable ignition and fire growth, which would allow for a more realistic gas 
temperature profile for the model to predict cable damage.  Alternatively, a 
independent model could be developed to complement the THIEF model.  This 
model could estimate when cable ignition occurs and assume cable damage at the 
time of ignition.  This approach is considered appropriate given that the data 
suggests cable failure will occur shortly after cable ignition. 
3. Future testing should increase the variability of the cable configurations.  Most of 
the testing to date has made only small variations from the base case.  The use of 
tray bends and vertical orientations are areas where limited data exists.  Also 
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variations in the thermal exposure (especially heat flux) would allow for 
verification of some of the results presented in this thesis. 
4. The fire-induced electrical cable damage data evaluated in this thesis were new, 
unused electrical cables.  Electrical cables used in NPPs age from natural 
conditions and from harsh or elevated thermal conditions and these aging 
mechanisms may cause electrical cables to fail at temperatures different than 
those temperature presented in this thesis.  Thus, to understand the effects aging 
has of fire-induced electrical cable failure characteristics, research should be 
completed to understand the aging effects to adequately quantify the fire risks 
associated with aged cable conditions representative of what is found in NPPs.  In 
addition, NPP conditions may occur where electrical cables are repeatedly 
exposed to elevated thermal conditions for long durations.  No research has been 
conducted to evaluate the mechanical failure mechanisms that these exposure 
conditions may induce. 
5. A model to correlate constant heat flux experimental exposures to actual fire 
scenario conditions (growth, steady state, decay) would allow for refinements in 















APPENDIX A : SUPPORTING INFORMATION  
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A.1 SCHEMATICS OF DC CIRCUITS AND CURRENT 
SUMMATION EQUATIONS 
 
Motor Operated Valve Circuit 
 
 
Figure A-1. Illustration of dc motor operated valve circuit showing current convention for 
current summation 
 
 isum_dcMOV = iP + iG + iR - ( iYC1 + iYO1 + iN )  Equation A-1 
 
Small Solenoid Operated Valve Circuit 
 
 
Figure A-2. Illustration of small dc solenoid operated valve circuit showing current 
convention for current summation 
 




































































1-Inch Valve Solenoid Operated Valve Circuit 
 
 
Figure A-3. Illustration of dc 1-inch valve solenoid operated valve circuit showing 
current convention for current summation 
 
 isum_dc1-INCH = iP + iG + iR - ( iS + iN1 + iN2 )  Equation A-3 
 
Large Coil Circuit 
 
 
Figure A-4. Illustration of dc large coil circuit showing current convention for current 
summation 
 






































































Medium Voltage Switchgear Circuit 
 
 
Figure A-5. Illustration of medium voltage switchgear dc control circuit showing current 
convention for current summation 
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A.2 DESIREE-FFIRE Intermediate-Scale Multiple Short to Ground 
Circuit Failure – Detailed Test Information  
 
Preliminary Test #2 
 
 
Figure A-6. Cable – circuit location in hood of intermediate-scale preliminary test #2 
 
 
Figure A-7. Current summation plot for intermediate-scale preliminary test #2 with 
ground monitoring circuit voltage signals. 
Time (s)










































Figure A-8. Cable – circuit location in hood of intermediate-scale test #1 
 
 
Figure A-9. Current summation plot for intermediate-scale test #1 with ground 
monitoring circuit voltage signals. 
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Figure A-10. Cable – circuit location in hood of intermediate-scale test #3 
 
 
Figure A-11. Current summation plot for intermediate-scale test #3 with ground 
monitoring circuit voltage signals. 
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Figure A-12. Cable – circuit location in hood of intermediate-scale test #5 
 
 
Figure A-13. Current summation plot for intermediate-scale test #5 with ground 
monitoring circuit voltage signals. 
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Figure A-14. Cable – circuit location in hood of intermediate-scale test #8 
 
 
Figure A-15. Current summation plot for intermediate-scale test #8 with ground 
monitoring circuit voltage signals. 
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Figure A-16. Cable – circuit location in hood of intermediate-scale test #9 
 
 
Figure A-17. Current summation plot for intermediate-scale test #9 with ground 












































Figure A-18. Cable – circuit location in hood of intermediate-scale test #10 
 
 
Figure A-19. Current summation plot for intermediate-scale test #10 with ground 
monitoring circuit voltage signals. 
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Figure A-20. Cable – circuit location in hood of intermediate-scale test #11 
 
 
Figure A-21. Current summation plot for intermediate-scale test #11 with ground 
monitoring circuit voltage signals. 
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Figure A-22. Cable – circuit location in hood of intermediate-scale test #12 
 
 
Figure A-23. Current summation plot 1 of 2 for intermediate-scale test #12 with ground 
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Figure A-24. Current summation plot 2 of 2 for intermediate-scale test #12 with ground 
monitoring circuit voltage signals. 
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' Trial1 Macro 
'g 
' do loop that copies the simulation run percentage into a new cell and repeats with new  
' simulation until done.  Sum is number of simulations, number of trials is set in  
' spreedsheet 
 
    Sum = 0 
    y = Sum + 2 
    Do While Sum < 1000 
    
 ' G1 is where mean trial probability is calculated for each simulation 
    Range("G1").Select 
    Selection.Copy 
' Selects proper cell in column of simulation results 
    ActiveCell.Offset(y, 8).Select 
    Selection.PasteSpecial Paste:=xlPasteValues, Operation:=xlNone, SkipBlanks _ 
        :=False, Transpose:=False 
    Sum = Sum + 1 
    y = y + 1 
    Loop 
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